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ABSTRACT
This article argues the text of the Magna Carta, now 800 years old, and
reflects many of the values that are at the center of the modern concept of
the Rule of Law. A careful review of its provisions reveals the Magna
Carta demonstrates a strong commitment to the resolution of disputes
based on rules and procedures that are consistent, accessible, transparent,
and fair; and to the development of a legal system characterized by official
accountability and respect for human dignity.
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I. FROM FEUDALISM TO THE DIGITAL AGE
The modern Rule of Law is a complex philosophic concept that defines
the ideals against which the integrity of "any legal system can be
measured."' Although writers differ in their definitions of the Rule of
Law,2 it is generally agreed that legal decisions must be based on rules that
are binding on persons regardless of rank. No one-not even a king,' a
president,' or a former governors-is above the law if a legal system is
faithful to the Rule of Law. In addition, the Rule of Law demands a legal
system be operated in a way that is consistent, accessible, transparent, fair,
even-handed,6 merits public confidence, and respects human dignity.
1. Vincent R. Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, The Rule of Law in China and the Prosecution of Li
Zhuang, 1 CHINESE J. COMP. LAW 66, 76 (2013); see id. ("[The [R]ule of [L]aw sets goals that are
difficult to achieve, and their attainment is never accidental.').
2. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 114, 119,
122 (2004) (identifying three indispensable components: "[g]overnment limited by law"; "formal
legality"; and "[Riule of [Law, not man"); Mortimer N.S. Sellers, WhatI the Rule ofLaw and Wy Is It
So Important?, in 38 IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LAW AND JUSTICE 3, 4 (James
R. Silkenat et al. eds., 2014) ("The [R]ule of [Law signifies 'the empire of laws and not of men': the
subordination of arbitrary power and the will of public officials as much as possible to the guidance
of laws made and enforced to serve their proper purpose, which is the public good ('res pubca') of
the community as a whole."); Benjamin A. Templin, Chinese Reverse Mergers, Accounting Regimes, and the
Rule of Law in China, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 119, 129 (2011) ("The World Bank takes a middle
ground approach defining the [R]ule of [Law in its World Governance Indicators ... project as
'capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence."').
3. See Larry May, Magna Carta, The Interstices of Procedure, and Guantidnamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 91, 101 (2009) ("Even kings, such as King Edward II [1307-1327], would declare that they
could not act 'contrary to Magna Carta and the common law of the realm' .... ").
4. See James F. McHugh, III, Book Review, 86 MASS. L. REV. 174, 174 (2002) (reviewing
RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA (2001)) ("President Nixon turned over what he
knew were powerfully damning tapes, President Clinton gave his deposition and President Truman
returned the [steel] mills. Those events occurred because ... the principal actors knew that our
collective commitment to the [Rule of [L]aw made any other course unthinkable.").
5. See Vincent R. Johnson, Rick Pery and the Lessons ofthe Magna Carta, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS (Mar. 1, 2015), http://digital.olivesoftware.com/Olive/ODE/SanAntonioExpressNews/
LandingPage/LandingPage.aspx?href=UOFFTi8yMDE1 LzAzLzAx&pageno=NzE.&entity=QXIwN
zEwMA..&view=ZW50aXR5 (discussing the prosecution of a former governor of Texas for alleged
abuse of office).
6. See ANDRAS SAJb, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 51 (2011) (describing the Rule of Law as
"at least partly" a "fairness-related neutral constitutional value").
7. "The American concept of the Rule of Law is complex." Vincent R. Johnson, The Rule of
Law and Enforcement of Chinese Tort Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 43, 80 (2011). Discussing U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, the article states:
[he Rule of Law demands that a legal system: operate transparently and consistently based on
neutral principles which manifest due concern for the correctness of decisions; provide fair
notice of what the law requires and treat all persons equally; hold governmental actors and
3
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A. Text Versus Intepretation
As the Magna Carta' (England's Great Charter of Liberties)' marks its
eighth centennial, it is appropriate to ask whether the key themes of
modern Rule of Law jurisprudence are expressed in the text of that
landmark document. Certainly, it would be possible to argue, regardless of
the specific language, the Magna Carta catalyzed legal developments in
England,'o the United States," and other countries," which ultimately
led to the robust contemporary support the Rule of Law now enjoys.' 3
private individuals accountable for their misconduct; and merit public respect through practices
which manifest an essential respect for human dignity.
Id.
8. English Translaon of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR., http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/
magna-carta-english-translation (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (providing a full-text translation of the
1215 edition of Magna Carta) [hereinafter 1215 Magna Carta]. The text "is available under the
Creative Commons License." Id.
9. The Latin term "Magna Carta" translates as "great charter." J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA
app. 6, at 441 (2d ed. 1992). An alternate spelling is "Magna Charta." See, for example, Chas. D.
Turner, Magna Charta, 4 TEX. L. REV. 46 (1925).
10. For example, the Magna Carta contains no language prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishments. However, it has been said "[t]he [English] Declaration of Rights' prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments was drawn originally from the Magna Carta, which 'required that the
amercement [or financial penalty] imposed on a criminal not... exceed the severity of his crime.'
John Niland & Riddhi Dasgupta, Texas Law's 'Life or Death" Rule in Capital Sentencing: Scrudnizng
Eighth Amendment Violaions and the Case of Juan Guerrem, Jr., 41 ST. MARY'S L.J. 231, 273 (2009)
(quoting James J. Brennan, The Supreme Court's Excessive Deference to Legislative Bodies Under Eighth
Amendment Sentencing Review, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 551, 552 (2004)).
11. See DANNY DANZIGER & JOHN GILLINGHAM, 1215: THE YEAR OF MAGNA CARTA, at
XII (Touchstone ed. 2004) (2003) (indicating the authors of the American Declaration of
Independence "professed to have read Magna Carta before they put pen to paper"). See Appendix A
(containing a resolution passed by the Texas House of Representatives to celebrate the 800th
anniversary of the Magna Carta and its positive impact on the law of Texas).
12. See The Rt. Hon. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord ChiefJustice of England, Foreword to the
Revised Edition of A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, at v (Univ. Press
of Va. rev. ed. 1998) (1964) ("The Charter was to transform constitutional thinking not only in the
land of its birth but also in the United States, Canada, India, and vast areas of the world which
learned from their example."); Dominic DiFruscio, Patriation, Poiics and Power The State of Balance
Between the Supreme Court and Pariament After Thir/y Years ofthe Charter, 8 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L.
29, 33 n.23 (2014) ("[Tlhe signing of the Magna Carta appears to be the foundational moment for
establishing the separation of powers that is now practiced in most Commonwealth countries."). But
see Michael Forsythe, Magna Car/a Exhibition in China Is Abruptly Moved from Universiy, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/world/asia/china-britain-magna-carta-
renmin-university.html?-r=0 (reporting that a planned exhibition of an original thirteenth century
Magna Carta was "abruptly moved [from a Beijing university museum] to the British ambassador's
residence, with few tickets available and no explanation given," and that "[t]he Chinese characters for
'Magna Carta' are censored in web searches on Sina Weibo, the country's Twitter-like social media
site').
13. See LARRY MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS 28-29 (2010) ('What transpired
over the centuries after Magna Carta was 'the long slow progression toward the "[Riule of [L]aw."");
4 [Vol. 47:1
2015] THE ANCIEAT MAGNA CARTA AND THE MODERN RULE OF LAW
However, it is a different and more difficult question to ask whether the
Magna Carta's provisions themselves expressly demonstrate concern for,
or commitment to, decision-making based on legal rules and processes
that are consistent, accessible, transparent, fair, even-handed, and inspired
by fidelity to institutional respectability and official accountability.
The answer to this question depends on a careful examination of the
language of the Magna Carta. It is not enough to assume, as many have,
that there must be support for every important legal concept in the text of
the Great Charter." 4 Writing a century ago, Professor William Sharp
McKechnie (1863-1930), the eminent Glasgow scholar, lamented that Sir
Edward Coke (1552-1634), the greatest jurist of the Elizabethan and
Jacobean eras,s "mislead generations of commentators" by "following his
vicious method of assuming the existence, in Magna Carta, of a warrant
for every legal principle of his own day." 1 6
Some important rights and liberties can be found nowhere in the Magna
Carta text.1 7 However, as time passed, those propositions have been read
back into the Charter, or linked to the Charter through interpretation or
historical accident. For example, the Magna Carta says nothing about the
writ of habeas corpus' 8 and indeed very little about criminal procedure.1 9
see also SAJO, supra note 6, at 47 ("[T]he [Riule of [L]aw... [is] endorsed, or at least not rejected
emotionally by an overwhelming majority [of the members of society] . . . .").
14. See, e.g., David Clark, The Icon of Liberty: The Status and Role of Magna Carta in Australian and
New Zealand Law, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 866, 868 (2000) ("[qhiefly 'sentimental value' has inspired
both litigants and judges to attribute to it all manner of legal phenomena that are not warranted by
the historical evidence.").
15. See 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, at xiii (Steve
Sheppard ed., 2003) ("Coke's influence was great at a pivotal moment in English and American
history."); J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 167 (4th ed. 2002)
(highlighting Sir Edward Coke's "reputation as the greatest lawyer of the time"); Edgar A. Hahn,
Edward Coke, in 14 ROWFANTIA, AN OCCASIONAL PUBLICATION OF THE ROWFANT CLUB 9, 9
(1949) ("Although Coke was essentially a lawyer and not a historian, the importance of his
contribution to a critical understanding of English history must not be underestimated.").
16. WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 385 (2d ed. 1914); id. at 381 (discussing how Coke found that the Magna
Carta required a grand jury and prohibited proceedings under martial law).
17. See id. at 394 (discussing the erroneous theory that holds the Magna Carta prohibits "the
Crown from making arrests without a warrant showing the cause of detention"); see generaly
GEOFFREY HINDLEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MAGNA CARTA: THE STORY OF THE ORIGINS OF
LIBERTY (2008) (noting a lack of express legal rights for women in medieval Europe).
18. See DANIELJOHN MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER
AND LIBERTY 5 (1966) ("The charter ... says nothing about the writ of habeas corpus."); id.
("Habeas corpus can be followed back through time as far, and indeed a bit farther, but along an
entirely different stream.").
19. Cf Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 302 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As we explained
in ... [Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)] 'bulwarks' of protection such as the Magna Carta
and the Due Process Clause 'guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of
5
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However, it has long been maintained that the rights to legally challenge
unlawful detention and unfair criminal procedures are implicit in the
charter's guarantee that a person accused of crime is protected from
adverse consequences, "except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by
the law of the land." 20 This is an enlightened reading of that famous
provision, well justified by public policy and subsequent legal history.
However, it cannot be said the text of the Magna Carta expressly
recognized a right to habeas corpus 2 1 or requires specific procedures (such
as cross-examination, a particular standard of proof, or a given number of
jurors) in criminal cases. In contrast, on many other subjects, the Magna
Carta was specific. For example, it defined with precision-in pounds and
schillings-the maximum amount of certain payments that were owed to
the Crown.2 2
B. Rooted in War and Status Relationshps
As a legal icon, the Magna Carta is more frequently invoked than
read.2 ' This is not surprising, for even the best translations of the Magna
Carta's medieval Latin text present obstacles to comprehension.2 1 Many
of the provisions in the Magna Carta are concerned with "feudal
incidents" 2 -the incidental rights of lords arising from feudalism's
individual rights to life, liberty, and property."').
20. Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Ongins of Broad Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1079, 1089 n.47 (1995) (citing 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 104 (3d ed. 1944, reprt. 1966)). "Over several centuries, habeas corpus developed to
require that such detention be justified by law, rather than mere personal whim." Id. at 1089. "Four
hundred years later, the Commons held that the writ of habeas corpus was directly derived from the
Magna Carta." Id. at 1089 n.47 (citing WILLIAM DuKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS 45 (1980)).
21. See MEADOR, supra note 18, at 5 (observing the Magna Carta does not mention a right to
habeas corpus).
22. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 2 (providing for an inheritance tax of 100 pounds
in the case of an earl and not more than 100 schillings in the case of a knight).
23. See NICHOLAS VINCENT, MAGNA CARTA: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 2 (2012)
("[M]ore often appealed to than actually read.").
24. Cf 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8 ("The precise meaning of a few clauses is still
uncertain.").
25. See Daniel v. Whartenby, 84 U.S. 639, 642 (1873) (explaining the feudal system favored "the
taking of estates by descent rather than by purchase, because in the former case the rights of
wardship, marriage, relief, and other feudal incidents attached, while in the latter the taker was
relieved from those burdens"). Feudal incidents were a great factor in shaping the development of
the law. See In re Estate of Lichtenstein, 247 A.2d 320, 337 (N.J. 1968) (noting the doctrine of
worthier title reflected the "greater advantage in feudal incidents thereby accruing to the lord of the
manor"); see also Edwin Smith, LLC v. Synergy Operating, LLC, 2012-NMSC-034, 13, 285 P.3d 656
("[ijoint tenancies emerged in part 'to avoid the feudal incidents triggered by the death of a tenant,'
that is, to benefit tenants rather than feudal lords by reducing the tenants' obligations to their
6 [Vol. 47:1
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hierarchical organization of status relationships.2 Thus, the document is
freighted with references to unfamiliar concepts, such as "scutage,'"2 7
"aid," 2 8  "relief," 2  "escheat,"so "disafforested" land,' "fee-farm," 2
lords.").
26. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 14 (underscoring the "the 'incidental' consequences of
lordship"); see also Turner, supra note 9, at 46-47 (describing the feudal system).
27. Clause 14 states:
To obtain the general consent of the realm for the assessment of an 'aid'--except in the three
cases specified above-or a 'scutage,' we will cause the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and
greater barons to be summoned individually by letter. To those who hold lands directly of us
we will cause a general summons to be issued, through the sheriffs and other officials, to come
together on a fixed day (of which at least forty days notice shall be given) and at a fixed place.
In all letters of summons, the cause of the summons will be stated. When a summons has been
issued, the business appointed for the day shall go forward in accordance with the resolution of
those present, even if not all those who were summoned have appeared.
1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 14. See Scutage, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining scutage as "[a] monetary payment levied by the [K]ing on barons as a substitute for some or
all of the knights to be supplied to the [K]ing by each baron").
28. Clause 12 states:
No 'scutage' or 'aid' may be levied in our kingdom without its general consent, unless it is for
the ransom of our person, to make our eldest son a knight, and (once) to marry our eldest
daughter. For these purposes only a reasonable 'aid' may be levied. 'Aids' from the city of
London are to be treated similarly.
1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 12. See Aid, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining aid as "[a] subsidy or tax granted to the [K]ing for an extraordinary purpose" or "[a]
benevolence or tribute (i.e., a sum of money) granted by the tenant to his lord in times of difficulty
and distress," and noting that "[o]ver time, these grants evolved from being discretionary to
mandatory").
29. Clause 2 states:
If any earl, baron, or other person that holds lands directly of the Crown, for military service,
shall die, and at his death his heir shall be of full age and owe a 'relief,' the heir shall have his
inheritance on payment of the ancient scale of 'relief[.]' That is to say, the heir or heirs of an
earl shall pay (100 for the entire earl's barony, the heir or heirs of a knight 100s. at most for the
entire knight's 'fee,' and any man that owes less shall pay less, in accordance with the ancient
usage of 'fees.'
1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 2. Clause 43 states:
If a man holds lands of any 'escheat' such as the 'honour' of Wallingford, Nottingham,
Boulogne, Lancaster, or of other 'escheats' in our hand that are baronies, at his death his heir
shall give us only the 'relief' and service that he would have made to the baron, had the barony
been in the baron's hand. We will hold the 'escheat' in the same manner as the baron held it.
Id. at cl. 43. See Rekfe BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining relief as "[a] payment
made by an heir of a feudal tenant to the feudal lord for the privilege of succeeding to the ancestor's
tenancy").
30. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 43 (discussing how escheat passes to the heirs); see
also Escheat, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining escheat as "[t]he reversion of land
ownership back to the lord when the immediate tenant dies without heirs").
31. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 47 ("All forests that have been created in our reign
shall at once be disafforested. River-banks that have been enclosed in our reign shall be treated
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"socage," 33 and "burgage." 34  Unfortunately, many of these references
occur at the beginning of the Charter and are likely to discourage the less
than fully determined reader from going further.
Even when the Magna Carta is read today, it is inevitably viewed with
modern eyes and with the benefits of hindsight. Thus, some writers argue
"the framers of [the] Magna Carta had grasped the essentially modern
principle that taxation and representation ought always to go together" and
the framers should be given "credit for anticipating the best features of
modern parliamentary government." 35  However, other scholars
disagree" and remind readers one must be careful not to attribute to the
genius of the charter's drafters later institutions that the original drafters
would have found unrecognizable.
The terms of the Magna Carta were negotiated on or near the
battlefront during a cessation in an English civil war" between King John
and rebellious barons. The barons had been driven to the breaking point
by John's abusive practices" and similar actions by his predecessors.3
similarly."); id. at cl. 53 (discussing the rendering of justice in connection with disafforested lands and
lands maintained as forests). "To disafforest meant to remove from royal jurisdiction; it did not mean
to clear-cut timber or destroy the trees." PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA CARTA MANIFESTO:
LIBERTIES AND COMMONS FOR ALL 31 (2008).
32. Clause 37 states:
If a man holds land of the Crown by 'fee-farm,' 'socage,' or 'burgage,' and also holds land of
someone else for knight's service, we will not have guardianship of his heir, nor of the land that
belongs to the other person's 'fee,' by virtue of the 'fee-farm,' 'socage,' or 'burgage,' unless the
'fee-farm' owes knight's service. We will not have the guardianship of a man's heir, or of land
that he holds of someone else, by reason of any small property that he may hold of the Crown
for a service of knives, arrows, or the like.
1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 37. See Fee Farm, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining fee farm as "[a] species of tenure in which land is held in perpetuity at a yearly rent (fee-
farm rent), without fealty, homage, or other services than those in the feoffment").
33. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 37 (discussing socage); see also Socage, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining socage as "[a] type of lay tenure in which a tenant held
lands in exchange for providing the lord husbandry-related (rather than military) service").
34. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 37 (discussing burgage); see also Bugage, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining burgage as "[a] type of socage tenure in which tenants
paid annual rents to the lord of the borough").
35. MCKECHINIE, supra note 16, at 249; see also 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 12, 14
(discussing taxation).
36. See, e.g., MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 249 ("The text, however, will scarcely bear so liberal
an interpretation.").
37. The war began on May 5, 1215 when the barons renounced their fealty. DANZIGER &
GILLINGHAM, supra note 11, at 249. The terms of the Magna Carta were finalized on June 15, 1215.
Id. at 250. The barons "renewed their homage to the king" four days later "and peace was
proclaimed." Id. "[War broke out again within three months. . .. " Id. at 251.
38. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 70 ("[King John's] reign had been scarred by hostage-taking,
allegations of rape, and the murder of prisoners.").
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In contrast, for example, to the United Nation's Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,40 the Magna Carta was not issued as a document
intended to articulate enlightened standards for far-flung places or future
ages. Rather, when King John sealed it in 1215, the Charter was focused
on pressing problems in feudal England.' Those troubles included
crushing taxation; excessive fines;4  the freedom of the Church;4  the
rights of widows, minor children, and heirs;4 s the operation of the
courts; 4 6 the duties of guardians;47 the rise of French immigrants within
English bureaucracy;4 8 and the hostages taken during the civil war.4 9  As
McKechnie explains, "[t]he object of the barons was to protect themselves
39. See id. at 24-25 ("[Tihe government of Henry II and his sons was founded upon
extortion ... ."); Hannis Taylor, Due Process ofLaw, 24 YALE L.J. 353, 358 (1915) ("What with feudal
incidents and scutages and indiscriminate fines, so heavy in amount that they could only be paid by
installments, a large proportion of Englishmen must have been permanently indebted to the
Crown.'.
40. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). "The
[Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights] ... adopted in 1948 ... has gradually evolved into the
Magna Carta of the international human rights movement." Thomas C. Buergenthal, The Human
Rights Revolution, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 3, 7 (1991). See also ARTHUR L. GOODHART, "LAW OF THE
LAND" 4 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1966) ("[Tlhe Charter was not a simple declaration of certain
general principles such as were the French Declaration of the Rights of Man . . . .").
41. See GOODHART, supra note 40, at 4 (asserting the charter was focusing on the troubles
happening between KingJohn and his barons in 1215).
42. See Turner, supra note 9, at 52 (discussing how King John greatly increased taxation to
support wars of conquest in France).
43. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 14 (detailing the process of assessment or
scutage). After the Norman Conquest, the problem of excessive discretionary fines (amercements) in
criminal cases became "prevalent" in England. Niland & Dasgupta, supra note 10, at 273; see also
MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 455 (quoting William Stubbs's assertion that John's "system of
fines ... was elaborated into that minute and grotesque instrument of torture which all the historians
of the reign have dwelt on in great detail").
44. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 1, 63 (declaring the English church will be free). A
continuing area of controversy concerned the selection of bishops. It was important to the English
kings to have a major say in who they were to be. ROBERT E. RODES, JR., ECCLESIASTICAL
ADMINISTRATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: THE ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE REFORMATION 129
(1977); see also Turner, supra note 9, at 48 (discussing the controversy over Stephen Langton's
appointment by Pope Innocent III as archbishop of Canterbury).
45. See discussion infra Section V.B.
46. See discussion infra Part II.
47. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 4 (prohibiting guardians of the land from engaging
in certain practices); id. at cl. 5 (specifying duties of guardians); id. at cl. 37 (restricting the King's role
in guardianship).
48. See RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA: THROUGH THE AGES 21 (2003) ("[A]lien
mercenaries who had fled Normandy with John in 1204 became royal favourites . . .. ").
49. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 49 ("We will at once return all hostages and
charters delivered up to us by Englishmen as security for peace or for loyal service."); id. at ci. 58
('We will at once return the son of Llywelyn, all Welsh hostages, and the charters delivered to us as
security for peace.").
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and their friends against the King, not to set forth a scientific system of
jurisprudence." 50
C. Readable and Understandable
The more than five dozen clauses in the Magna Carta follow no
discernible plan of organization, and some of the most important
provisions are buried deep within the document. However, if one can get
past the jumbled arrangement of the material and the arcane references to
feudalism, many of the provisions are eminently readable and can be easily
understood. This alone makes the Great Charter an intellectual landmark.
Its clarity and succinctness stand in sharp opposition to other legal relics
of the same feudal world, such as the intricate organization of the King's
courts,s" the complex writ system for gaining access to tribunals,52 the
multitudinous forms of action," the bewildering rules of property law,5
and the Year Books containing cryptic reports of medieval litigation."
Even more surprising is the fact that, despite the Magna Carta's focus
on the legal, political, and social issues of the early thirteenth century, its
text reflects many of the concerns that are central to today's understanding
of the Rule of Law. Considering that eight centuries have passed and that
there are profound differences between the feudal age and the digital age,
these commonalities are remarkable. They suggest that the ancient Magna
Carta and modern Rule of Law jurisprudence were, in a phrase, cut from
the same cloth or animated by the same intellectual DNA. Upon reading
50. McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 382 (summarizing the scope of protection against the King).
51. See id. at 270-76 (discussing the Curia Regis, the travelling justices, the Justices of Assize, and
the petty assizes).
52. See Edward Jenks, The Preogaive Writs in Engksh Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 531 (1923)
("According to the well known passage in Bracton's great work, writs are either (a) original or (b)
judicial; 'originals' are either (a) patent or (b) close; or they are (a) 'of course' or (b) 'magisterial[;]' or
they are (a) 'real' or (b) 'personal' or (c) 'mixed."' (footnote omitted)).
53. See F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF
LECTURES 5 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1976) (1909)
(noting there are "as many forms of action as there are causes of action").
54. See Philip A. Joseph, The Envimnment, Pperly Rsghts, and Pubic Choice Theory, 20 N.Z. U. L.
REV. 408, 408 (2003) ("The mixing of English feudal and Roman property law principles produced,
for English common law, a complex epistemology that seeks to conciliate two elements: the private
and public dimensions of property.").
55. See WILLIAM CRADDOCK BOLLAND, A MANUAL OF YEAR BOOK STUDIES 3 (1925)
(explaining the books are written in "old Gothic character[s], with its drastic abbreviations" and
require readers to have "intimate knowledge of the old law and the old procedure"); Percy H.
Winfield, Abridgments ofthe Year Books, 37 HARV. L. REV. 214, 214 (1923) ("Mhe very language ...
[is] unfamiliar to many lawyers."); J.H. Beale, Book Review, 29 HARV. L. REV. 887, 893 (1916)
("m[The learning is obsolete, the facts undramatic.").
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the Magna Carta, one finds that the ancient document lives up to the
legend. The Magna Carta is where modern legal thought began.
D. The Many Magna Car/as
Many persons have heard of the Magna Carta, but few are aware that
there were many Magna Cartas. KingJohn (reigned 1199-1216) sealed the
initial version on parchment dated June 15, 1215.56 That document,
which dealt with many subjects of great public interest, was widely
published through readings across England." Consequently, according to
historian Doris M. Stenton:
Much of the awe and romance which through the ages has come to
surround the Great Charter was already in the ears and eyes of those who
first heard its terms proclaimed and saw in the hands of the King's officer
the actual document sealed with the King's great seal.5 8
The Magna Carta was not a secret treaty or an abstruse legal document.
Indeed, its terms were quickly and openly announced to the public. In the
"hectic weeks after the sealing of the Charter," during a hiatus in the civil
war, "knowledge of its terms was driven home to the people by
proclamation throughout the land.""
However, the 1215 Charter was never implemented in any important
respect, and soon became a dead letter.6 o Within three months, King
John had repudiated the charter."1 Innocent III,` "one of the ablest
56. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 72 ("The date of the charter, 15 June, is now generally
accepted as that on which the first copy of the charter was sealed, although the process of issue took
several weeks thereafter . . . .").
57. See DoRIs M. STENTON, AFTER RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA IN THE MIDDLE AGES 9
(1965) ("[R]oyal orders were addressed, not only to all the sheriffs, but to all the King's foresters,
warreners, keepers of river banks, and bailiffs, commanding that the Charter 'should be publicly
read. . . ."); id. at 9-10 ("It is impossible to believe that this long document was read aloud in the
shire courts in Latin. People would have rioted. They were too keenly interested ... [in] hearing and
understanding ... in their own mother tongue."); see also VINCENT, supra note 23, at 72 ("[Clopies,
perhaps as many as forty, were ... sent out to be proclaimed in the individual English county
courts.").
58. STENTON, supra note 57, at 10.
59. Id. at 16.
60. See DANZIGER & GILLINGHAM, supra note 11, at 267 (describing the Magna Carta as an
"abysmal failure," which was "surely dead" by the end of 1215).
61. See G.R.C. DAVIS, MAGNA CARTA 13-14 (Brit. Libr. 12th ed. 1999) (indicating the 1215
Magna Carta went into effect in mid-June, and notice of its nullification by the Pope was received by
the end of September through a letter dated August 24 and 25).
62. See Robert Swanson, Papa/Monarchy: 1085-143 1, in THE PAPACY 80, 85 (Michael Walsh ed.,
1997) (noting that with "one of the most significant pontificates in papal history," Innocent III,
"[u]ntil his death in July 1216,... appear[ed] as the dominant individual in Europe").
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popes,"' 3 nullified it on the grounds it had been extracted by coercion.6 4
Thus, the English civil war soon resumed.6 Fortunately, roughly a year
into the renewed fighting, King John died of dysentery on October 19,
1216,66 leaving his nine-year-old son, Henry III, to succeed him.6' That
royal transition changed the course of world history for it gave the Magna
Carta a second chance.
For political purposes,6 1 the Magna Carta of 1215, which had been
scorned by King John and reviled by the Pope, was resurrected and
reissued in a revised form by the new King's advisors.6' Their goal was to
make peace with the barons and drive the barons' French allies back across
the Channel.70 To accomplish this objective, the King's advisors decided
to retain enough of the 1215 Charter to appeal to the barons and the
masses, but not so much as to seriously hamper the new king."
The original sixty-three clauses of the 1215 Charter dwindled to forty in
the 1216 Magna Carta, with a text equivalent of almost 4,600 English
words in 1215 reduced to about 3,100 words in 1216.7 To the great
credit of the young King's advisors, who acted forthrightly, almost all of
the deletions" were fully identified in a clause of the 1216 Charter, which
63. DANZIGER & GILLINGHAM, supra note 11, at XIV.
64. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 81 (listing one of the reasons for annulment as "because
extracted by force'); see also STENTON, supra note 57, at 9 ("By a letter dated August 24, 1215, at
Anagni [east of Rome], the Pope solemnly annulled it.... [TIhis news reached England near the end
of September... .'.
65. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 81 ("By 17 September, the [K]ing was once again ordering
the seizure of rebel lands .... Peace dissolved into civil war.').
66. STENTON, supra note 57, at 20.
67. VINCENT, supra note 23, at 81.
68. See DANZIGER & GILLINGHAM, supra note 11, at 261 (asserting the reissuing of the Magna
Carta of 1215 was a highly effective "propaganda move').
69. See RICHARD THOMSON, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE MAGNA CARTA OF KING JOHN
cl. 62, at 116 (London,John Major & RobertJennings 1829).
[Blecause we have not as yet any seal, we have caused the present Charter to be sealed with the
seals of our venerable father the Lord Gualo, Cardinal Priest by the title of Saint Martin, Legate
of the Apostolic See; and of William Marshal Earl of Pembroke, the guardian of us and of our
kingdom, at Bristol the twelfth day of November, in the first year of our reign.
Id.
70. "It was not until 11 September 1217 that France and England made peace. . ..
LINEBAUGH, supra note 31, at 36.
71. See STENTON, supra note 57, at 17 ("The omitted provisions were in the main those which
might have hampered the men responsible for recovering his kingdom for the young King.').
72. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 4 (establishing "nearly one-third" of the 1215 Magna Carta's
words were "either dropped or substantially rewritten within the first ten years of its existence").
73. But see STENTON, supra note 57 at 17 (admitting "[n]o mention was made of the [deletion of
the] arrangements, so offensive to the King, by which the barons had tried to secure the royal
observance of the Charter in the previous year ([Clause] 61)," which called for enforcement by
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indicated that those provisions dealt with matters that were "weighty and
doubtful" and required further study." All this was done with lightning
speed. "King John died on October 19; his son was crowned on the other
side of England on October 28; [and] the [new] Charter [was] dated on
November 12, in the same year 1216.""
The 1216 reissuance was just the beginning of a new life for the
resurrected Charter. All told, Henry III (reigned 1216-72) and his
successor, Edward I (reigned 1272-1307), reissued the Magna Carta at
least six times.7 All of the reissued versions differed substantially from
the 1215 Charter.7 Thus, depending on which Magna Carta is at issue,
the relevant date may be 1215, 1216, 1217, 1225, 1265, 1297, or 1300.7
Like a comet that appeared by popular demand, the Magna Carta
continually pierced the dark sky of the thirteenth century.
Until the eighteenth century, "the 1215 and 1225 charters were
hopelessly confused." 7 ' The 1225 Magna Carta is the one that was
eventually set out in the place of greatest honor at the beginning of
England's first roll of statutes in 1297.80 However, the 1215 Magna Carta
is undoubtedly the most famous. That first edition is the one that arose
from the dramatic confrontations between King John and the barons that
have since been depicted in countless works of art." The 1215 Charter
contained all of the provisions for which the Magna Carta has become
famous. Importantly, in the later versions of the Magna Carta, "the legal
and administrative clauses of 1215 were preserved."8 2
In none of the editions of the Magna Carta were the substantive clauses
twenty-five barons).
74. THOMSON, supra note 69, at 115-16. Many of the matters in question never reappeared in
legal form, although some did.
75. STENTON, supra note 57, at 20.
76. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 87 (listing dates of the reissues).
77. See DAVIS, supra note 61, at 9 (acknowledging the excisions and alterations between each
reissue of the Magna Carta).
78. See NICHOLAS VINCENT, A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRITAIN 1066-1485, at 298 (2011) ('The
1297 reissue was in effect [the] Magna Carta's swan song ... granted one final outing in 1300
(reissued under Edward I's great seal this time, rather than the seal of absence which had been
employed in 1297)...."); VINCENT, supra note 23, at 4 ("[Tlhe [Charter as a whole was already
treated as an archaic relic as long ago as 1300, when it was for the last time granted a full reissue by a
[Kjing of England . ..
79. VINCENT, supra note 23, at 92.
80. See DAVIS, supra note 61, at 9 (designating the 1225 reissue as the "third and final revision
of 1225"); VINCENT, supra note 23, at 87 (writing that the text for the 1297 confirmation of the 1225
Charter "seems to have been taken from .. . an unofficial lawyer's collection").
81. See DANZIGER & GILLINGHAM, supra note 11, at 250-51 (asserting the Magna Carta was a
compromise between KingJohn and the barons).
82. VINCENT, smpra note 23, at 82.
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numbered. However, historians have inserted numerals into translations
for purposes of convenient reference. The numbers mentioned in this
article refer to the sixty-three Clauses in the 1215 Magna Carta as
translated on the website of the British Library.8 3
The following sections explain the text of the 1215 Magna Carta in light
of the expectations of the modern Rule of Law and the issues faced by the
English legal system eight centuries ago. Part II deals with whether legal
decisions would be based on law and evidence; Part III with issues related
to ethics in government; Part IV with institutional respectability; Part V
with respect for human dignity; Part VI with equality of treatment; Part
VII with provisions in the Magna Carta unrelated to the Rule of Law; and
Part VIII offers concluding thoughts.
II. DECISIONS BASED ON LAWS AND EVIDENCE
The Rule of Law requires that a society be committed to the resolution
of disputes and the imposition of punishment in accordance with
established rules and procedures, and based on the relevant evidence. 8 4
Arbitrary decisions and excessive penalties are abhorred,8 s as is the
unreasoned disregard of established legal principles.8 6
A. Legal Supremay
The most famous provision in the 1215 Magna Carta is Clause 39."
That Clause declares, in language often quoted and still sparkling with
gem-like quality, a firm and unquestionable commitment to the
importance of legal principles and the role that they play in constraining
the use of force. Clause 39 states:
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way,
83. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8.
84. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1007 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring with the judgment) ("[T]he [Riule of [L]aw is imperiled by sentences imposed for no
discernible reason other than the subjective reactions of the sentencing judge.').
85. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[P]reventing
the arbitrary administration of punishment is a basic ideal of any society that purports to be governed
by the [R]ule of [L]aw."); Sellers, supra note 2, at 8 ("The [R]ule of [L]aw is so valuable precisely
because it limits the arbitrary power of those in authority.").
86. This is why many of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions discussing the Rule of Law involve
the issue of stare decisis. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 55-58 (quoting U.S. Supreme Court decisions
discussing the Rule of Law); see also Stare Decsis, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(de6ning stare decisis as "to stand by things decided").
87. See DAVIS, supra note 61, at 9 (identifying Clauses 39 and 40 as the most famous clauses of
the Magna Carta).
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nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except
by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.8 8
To the twenty-first century reader, this product of the medieval world
seems entirely modern and enlightened. Clause 39 is animated by the same
ideas that drive modern Rule of Law jurisprudence and its commitment to
legal principles.
Clause 39 arose directly out of King John's abuses. "In some cases
John proceeded, or threatened to proceed, by force of arms against
recalcitrants as though assured of their guilt, without waiting for legal
procedure."8 9 In other cases, John attacked his enemies by subjecting
them to a "travesty of judicial process." 90 John's "political and personal
enemies were exiled, or deprived of their estates, by the judgment of a
tribunal composed [not of their equals but] entirely of Crown
nominees."91  Driven by John's avarice, "the machinery of justice was
[often merely] an engine for transferring land and money to his
treasury." 92
While scholars and jurists have debated for eight centuries the
narrowness9 3 or breadth" of Clause 39, which some say applies "only to
abuses of criminal process,"" its essential point is clear. "John was no
longer to take the law into his own hands: the deliberate judgment of a
competent court of law must precede any punitive measures to be taken by
the King against freemen of his realm."96 Execution could not be placed
before judgment. More specifically, under Clause 39, there must be a
judgment; the judgment must precede punishment, and the judgment must
be imposed by equals in a manner otherwise consistent with the law of the
land.9 7
88. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 39.
89. McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 377.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 378; see also id. at 384 (discussing how outlawry was used to place a price on mens'
heads and terrify them until they fled the country).
92. Id. at 383.
93. See id. at 380 ("[T]he older, more technical signification was gradually forgotten .....
94. Expansively construed, "It has been usual to read ... [Clause 39] as a guarantee of trial by
jury to all Englishmen; as absolutely prohibiting arbitrary commitment; and as solemnly undertaking
to dispense to all and sundry an equal justice, full, free, and speedy." Id. at 376.
95. Id. at 382 n.2.
96. Id. at 381.
97. McKechnie argues that in the context of Clause 39 "or" means "and," therefore judgment
had to be imposed by peers and in accordance with the law of the land. See id. at 377, 381-82 (noting
the agreement among experts on medieval Latin that 'vel' is sometimes equivalent to 'et). However,
juries today play a reduced role in criminal proceedings. See Antoinette Plogstedt, E-Jurors: A View
from the Bench, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 597, 599-600 (2013) ("In some countries, jury systems have been
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B. Due Process
Clause 39 has been credited as the first embodiment of the "English
idea of due process"9 8 and its American progeny.9 9  Thus, it was said on
the 700th anniversary of the Magna Carta, "[a]fter being reproduced in all
the original [American] state constitutions[] Clause 39 passed into the
[f]ederal Constitution in this form: 'No person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."" 0 0 Elaborating on this
theme in Duncan v. Louisiana,'' Justice Hugo Black explained:
The origin of the Due Process Clause is [Clause] 39 of [the] Magna
Carta .... As early as 1354 the words 'due process of law' were used in an
English statute interpreting [the] Magna Carta, and by the end of the 14th
century 'due process of law' and 'law of the land' were interchangeable.
Thus the origin of this clause was an attempt by those who wrote [the]
Magna Carta to do away with the so-called trials of that period where people
were liable to sudden arrest and summary conviction in courts and by
judicial commissions with no sure and definite procedural protections and
under laws that might have been improvised to try their particular cases.
[Clause] 39 of [the] Magna Carta was a guarantee that the government would
take neither life, liberty, nor property without a trial in accord with the law of
the land that already existed at the time the alleged offense was committed.
This means that the Due Process Clause gives all Americans ... the right to
be tried by independent and unprejudiced courts using established
procedures and applying valid pre-existing laws. 10 2
The 1215 Charter says little about litigation processes other than that
legal consequences for a party must be based on "the lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land."'os Nevertheless, because the idea of
due process is inherent in the Great Charter, the "Magna Carta and the
writ of habeas corpus have become inextricably linked,"'o although the
writ is not mentioned in the Charter. The reasoning behind this linkage is
abolished completely.... In the many countries that maintain a criminal jury system, juries are used
primarily for the most serious criminal offenses."). Thus, it is easy for a modern observer to
conclude that sanctions imposed in accordance with Clause 39 as it was written (using "or" rather
than "and") offers substantial protection from arbitrary punishment, assuming that the "law of the
land" is not seriously de6cient-procedurally or substantively.
98. Taylor, supra note 39, at 354.
99. See id. (discussing how, in America, Clause 39 materialized in the U.S. Constitution through
the Fifth Amendment).
100. Id.
101. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
102. Id at 169 (Black, J., concurring).
103. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 39.
104. MEADOR, supra note 18, at 3.
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quite simple: the Magna Carta requires due process, and the "Great Writ"
is "the remedy for restraints on liberty contrary to due process of law."'1 5
On the 700th anniversary of the Magna Carta, it was argued in the pages
of the Yale Law Journal by Hannis Taylor, a lawyer and diplomat,1 o that
the Anglo-American principle of due process "has no prototype in the
constitutional history of any other people." 1 7  If that was true then, it is
certainly not true now, a hundred years later. Due process is an ideal now
firmly implanted in modern Rule of Law jurisprudence, 0 8  which
articulates aspirations that are endorsed, and often lived up to, 0 9 in many
parts of the world. Due process is now an established concept in
international legal dialogue. For example, in a recent critique of a criminal
prosecution in China, published in the Chinese Journal of Comparative Law,
my co-author and I explained to an audience in China and beyond that
[i]n determining whether a legal system comports with the [R]ule of [L]aw,
perhaps nothing is more important than due process. In the most basic
terms, due process entails both notice and hearing. Persons must have
notice of what the law requires and, in defending against accusations, notice
of the claims against them. Persons must also have a fair opportunity to
state a legal claim or assert a defence, and this opportunity must occur
before a decision is made by the adjudicatory authority. If a decision is
reached before the arguments are heard and the evidence is considered, the
purported observance of procedures is not compliant with the [R]ule of
[L]aw but is simply a mockery of justice.1 10
C. TialbyJury
In the view of many, the idea of trial by jury is synonymous with the
105. Id. at 4.
106. Hannis Taylor (1851-1922) "pursued the multifaceted career of practicing attorney,
constitutional historian, journalist, diplomat, and ever-aspiring politician." TENNANT S.
MCWILLIAMS, HANNIS TAYLOR: THE NEW SOUTHERNER AS AN AMERICAN, at ix (1978).
107. Taylor, supra note 39, at 353.
108. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing due process as
a "fundamental principle of the [R]ule of [L]aw"); Kendall L. Manlove, Note, Process Long Overdue:
TransitionalJustice, Prisoners, and Procedural Due Process Reform, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1249, 1251
(2014) ("[D]ue process is an essential aspect of upholding the [Rjule of [L]aw.").
109. "The [World Justice Project] Rule of Law Index is a quantitative assessment tool designed
to provide a comprehensive picture of the extent to which countries adhere to the [Riule of [L]aw in
practice." THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX
2014, at 217, http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/
wjp-rule.oflaw index_2014_report.pdf.
110. Johnson & Loomis, supra note 1, at 77.
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Magna Carta."' Thus, when American judges cite the Magna Carta in
explaining to citizens called for jury duty the importance of their role in
the administration of justice, it is with this connection in mind.' 1 2 Clause
39's reference to judgment by one's equals or peers is "what we might
think of today as the right to trial by jury."1 1
However, "[w]hether or not the Magna Carta's reference to a judgment
by one's peers was a reference to a 'jury'-[is] a fact that historians now
dispute.""' There are at least three possibilities: the first is that trial by
jury was a mode of adjudication established sometime before the Magna
Carta, the second is that the Magna Carta created trial by jury, and the
third is that trial by jury was legal innovation established after the Magna
Carta was sealed.
As to the first possibility, some have argued that Clause 39 intended to
restore a jury system that was already in place in England prior to 1215,
but disregarded by King John. For example, Nicholas Vincent, a Magna
Carta scholar,"s writes that after the Norman Conquest in 1066:
the customary laws of the Anglo-Saxons were to a large extent preserved,
including most famously the idea of the jury of twelve men, responsible in
English law from at least the 1160s until 1879 not just as a "trial jury" for
determining guilt or innocence but as a "jury of presentment" for
"presenting" suspected criminals for trial (in some ways equivalent to the
modern American "Grand Jury," for the investigation, not merely the trial of
wrongdoing)." 6
As to the second possibility, some jurists and scholars suggest the
Magna Carta created trial by jury. In a typical passage from a judicial
opinion, Justice Byron White wrote in Duncan v. Louisiana, "by the time our
111. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238-39 (2005) ("The Framers of the
Constitution understood the threat of 'judicial despotism' that could arise from 'arbitrary
punishments upon arbitrary convictions' without the benefit of a jury in criminal cases.... The
Founders presumably carried this concern from England, in which the right to a jury trial had been
enshrined since the Magna Carta.'); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84 (1942) ("Since it
was first recognized in Magna Carta, trial by jury has been a prized shield against oppression. . . .").
112. See Jim Parsons, Jury Service and jury Trial Improvements, app. 1, at i (July 19, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/6371/59001.pdf
(quoting judge Parson's opening instruction to a Texas jury).
113. VINCENT, supra note 23, at 4.
114. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 91 n.27 (1970).
115. See Personnel, THE MAGNA CARTA PROJECT, http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/about/
personnel (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (identifying Nicholas Vincent as the author of works on "the
English and European context of Magna Carta" as well as the writer of the catalogue for a Sotheby's
auction of a 1297 issue of the Magna Carta).
116. VINCENT, supra note 23, at 8.
18 [Vol. 1
2015] THE ANCIENAT MAGNA CARTA AND THE MODERN RULE OF LAW 1
Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal cases had been in existence
in England for several centuries and carried impressive credentials traced
by many to [the] Magna Carta."' 17 However, the idea that trial by jury
originated in the Magna Carta seems improbable as a matter of logistics.
As noted earlier, the Magna Carta was crafted on the battlefront during a
break in an ongoing civil war."' It is unlikely an entirely new mode for
resolving disputes would have been agreed to in that environment and yet
so poorly expressed in the terms of the Great Charter."1 9
The third possibility is that trial by jury originated sometime after the
Magna Carta was sealed. Embracing this view, some scholars are emphatic
that Clause 39 does not require a criminal petty jury. 1 20  Because the
institution "had not been invented in 1215" they argue that "to introduce
trial by jury into John's Great Charter is an unpardonable
anachronism." 1 21  These scholars contend that "[t]he idea of a trial, in
which the judge and the jury listen to the evidence produced by both
parties, was entirely unknown at that time." 1 2 2 As Arthur L. Goodhart, a
professor of jurisprudence at the University of Oxford,12 3 explained in a
small book published to celebrate the 750th anniversary of the Magna
Carta:
[T]he procedure they followed was an astonishing one, for it has been
summed up by saying that "judgment preceded proof." This apparently
absurd statement can, however, be explained when we realize that the word
"judgment" here refers to the preliminary decision concerning the procedure
to be adopted at the trial, and not a final judgment to be reached in accord
with that procedure.... Mhe first decision was that of the jury of peers
while the final decision was reached by methods that seem strange to us....
[he jury of peers, i.e., of equals, determined whether the party should be
117. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968).
118. See DANZIGER & GILLINGHAM, supra note 11, at 249-51 (identifying the beginning date
of the war as May 5, 1215; the date of the finalization of the terms of the Magna Carta as
June 15, 1215; the date that peace was proclaimed as June 19; and indicating war broke out three
months later).
119. See id. at 251 ("[A]s drawn up in June 1215, [the] Magna Carta was bound to fail. Naturally
no king could look kindly upon a document to which his consent had been extorted by force.").
120. See id. at 270 ("[The myth that the right to trial by jury goes back to [the] Magna Carta is
one that remains widely believed in today.").
121. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 393.
122. GOODHART, supra note 40, at 19.
123. See Arthur Goodhart Virifing Profetsor in Legal Science, U. OF CAMBRIDGE,
http://www.squire.law.cam.ac.uk/eminentscholars/arthurgoodhart-professors.php (last visited
Nov. 15, 2015) (announcing a Visiting Professor of Legal Science position to be awarded in
commemoration of Arthur L. Goodhart, who was Emeritus Professor of jurisprudence at Oxford
University).
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put to his proof in one of the established ways: ordeal by hot iron or by
water,12 compurgation,125 wager of law, 1 2 6  trial by battle,1 27  or
production of charter.' 2 8
Adherents of this third view argue trial by jury developed only after trial
by ordeal gradually fell out of fashion following the Roman Catholic
Church's Fourth Lateran Council. That conclave, held in Rome in 1215,
"at almost the same time that the barons were meeting at Runnymede," 12 9
forbade the clergy from taking part in judicial ordeals, "thus robbing the
trial [by ordeal] of all religious sanction.'>13o It was only years later,
holders of the third view say, that the words in Clause 39 were given a
different meaning.1 3 1
Regardless of which of the three views is correct, Clause 39 contributed
to establishing the principle of trial by jury based on relevant evidence.
Clause 39 "supplied the congenial soil wherein the principle of trial of
peers was able to expand and grow to maturity."' 3 2  Clause 39 prevented
124. Ordeal was "[a] primitive form of trial in which an accused person was subjected to a ...
dangerous or painful physical test, the result being considered a divine revelation of the person's guilt
or innocence." Ordeal, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Trial by ordeal was virtually
abolished by the Lateran Council in 1215, the same year the Magna Carta was signed. See
MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 375 ("In 1217 a change occurred, which was undoubtedly a
consequence of the virtual abolition of the ordeal by the Lateran Council in 1215.").
125. "Compurgation," also known as "wager oflaw" or "ttial by oath," was "[a] medieval trial by
which a defendant could have supporters (called compurgators), frequently [eleven] in number, testify
that they believed the defendant was telling the truth." Compurgation, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). "If a defendant on oath and in a set form of words will deny the charge against him,
and if he can get a certain number of other persons (compurgators) to back his denial by their oaths,
he will win his case. If he cannot get the required number, or they do not swear in proper form, 'the
oath bursts,' and he will lose." Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 305-08 (7th ed. 1956)).
126. See Wager of Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("A method of proof in
which a person defends against a claim by swearing that the claim is groundless, and by enlisting
others (compurgators) to swear to the defendant's credibility.").
127. "Trial by combat"-also known as "trial by wager of battle," "trial by duel," "judicial
combat," or "duellum"-is "[a] trial that is decided by personal battle between the disputants,... the
idea being that God would give victory to the person in the right." Trial by Combat, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). "This method was introduced into England by the Normans after
1066, but it was a widely detested innovation and was little used.... [And was eventually] replaced in
practice by the grand assize and indictment." Id
128. GOODHART, supra note 40, at 19 (internal footnotes added).
129. Id. at 20.
130. Id
131. See id. at 19 (explaining that the modern version of a trial "was entirely unknown at that
time").
132. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 389 (alteration in original) (citing L.W. VERNON
HARCOURT, His GRACE THE STEWARD AND TRIAL OF PEERS: A NOVEL INQUIRY INTO A SPECIAL
BRANCH OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 236 (1907) (suggesting Clause 39's ambiguity
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the King from condemning a suspect before holding some form of a
trial. 3 3
Interestingly, the Magna Carta contains two other, lesser known,
provisions dealing with judgment by equals.' 3  The first dealt with a type
of jury that had a role to play in certain controversies arising from military
actions.' In his war against the English barons, King John's "fearful
punitive raid of waste and pillage" had pushed as far north as the Scottish
lowlands.' 3 6 Around the same time, King Alexander II of Scotland
retreated into Northumberland"' in northern England, where the barons
had recently done homage to him during the "turmoil of 1215.",13' To
address the resulting legal issues and implement the barons' desire to
appease Alexander,' 3 1 Clause 59 of the 1215 Magna Carta states:
With regard to the return of the sisters and hostages of Alexander,
[K]ing of Scotland, his liberties and his rights, we will treat him in the same
way as our other barons of England, unless it appears from the charters that
we hold from his father William, formerly [K]ing of Scotland, that he should
be treated otherwise. This matter shall be resolved by the judgment of his
equals in our court.140
In addition, Clause 56 provides in part:
If we have deprived or dispossessed any Welshmen of lands, liberties,
or anything else in England or in Wales, without the lawful judgment of their
equals, these are at once to be returned to them. A dispute on this point
shall be determined in the Marches by the judgment of equals.141
Arguably, Clauses 56 and 59, in contrast to Clause 39, more clearly
imply that the "equals" will render a final judgment and resolve these
various matters.
contributed to its success and development)).
133. See GOODHART, supra note 40, at 20 (noting that the King was prevented "from
condemning a free man before a trial").
134. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 56, 59.
135. Id. at cl. 59.
136. See HINDLEY, uipra note 17, at 246 (reporting on King John's northward advancement
into Berwick-upon-Tweed before entering the lowlands).
137. See id. (describing how King Alexander II "retreated pell-mell from his own harrying raids
into Northumberland").
138. See id. at 175 (recognizing the Scots' reprieve from strife when the barons paid homage to
King Alexander II).
139. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 459 (suggesting reconciliation with Alexander was an
underlying motive behind Clause 59).
140. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 59.
141. Td at rt S6.
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D. EvidentiaU Suport
Under the Rule of Law, legal decisions must be based on the relevant
evidence.1 4 2 In addition
[1]he [R]ule of [L]aw demands that legal decision-making processes must be
structured in a way that minimizes the chances that errors will occur and that
provides a fair opportunity for correcting errors that nevertheless are made.
Consequently, fact-finding processes must ensure the reliability of
evidentiary determinations and provide opportunities for identifying and
rectifying legal mistakes. In part, this process means that the application of
the law to the facts must be sufficiently transparent that errors can be
identified. In the usual case,... affected individuals are entitled to learn the
evidence against them as well as the reasons for a court's decision, and they
must have a fair opportunity to challenge the errors on appeal.14
According to the Rule of Law, allegations unsupported by evidence are
not sufficient to trigger legal consequences. Reflecting this concern,
Clause 38 of the 1215 Magna Carta states:
In [the] future no official shall place a man on trial upon his own
unsupported statement, without producing credible witnesses to the truth of
i.144it.
To modem eyes, this provision seems unsurprising and consistent with
the Rule of Law. However, it may have been revolutionary. The
provision offered "real protection to the common man" against abuses by
arrogant manorial officials.' 4 5
142. See S. Ronald Ellis, A Smoking-Gun Reform Strategyfor Rights Tribunals, 16 CAN.J. ADMIN. L.
& PRAC. 279, 284 (2003) ("Mhe [R]ule-of-[L]aw promise is that disputes about rights will be
resolved on the basis of law and evidence, in fair hearings, before independent and impartial
tribunals."); see also Charles L. Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 1625, 1673 (2013)
("The problem with allowing historical evidence about the true basis for decisions is not merely that
it wastes time but that it undermines the [R]ule of [L]aw by rendering the law deeply indeterminate.").
143. Johnson & Loomis, supra note 1, at 77-78.
144. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 38.
145. STENTON, supra note 57, at 12. A century ago, McKechnie offered a different translation
and divergent interpretation. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 370 (translating Clause 38 as,
"Bailiffs .. . were [not] to abuse their authority: henceforth they shall put no man to his 'lex' on their
own initiative."). McKechnie believed that what we think of as a trial based on evidence was not well
established when the Magna Carta was enacted in 1215. See id. at 393 (asserting the criminal jury had
not been instituted by 1215). Instead, Clause 38, translated into different terms, had to be reconciled
with other forms of trial that were still the norm. See id at 370 (identifying the forms of judicial test
as including compurgation, ordeal, and combat). McKechnie suggests that if more recent scholars
have made a mistake in translating and interpreting Clause 39, "[tlhe mistake probably owes its origin
to a tendency of later generations to explain what was unfamiliar in the Great Charter by what was
familiar in their own experience." See id at 392 (describing how later generations "found nothing in
their own day to correspond with the judicium paium of 1215").
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III. ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT
The Rule of Law condemns'1 6 corrupt official practices' 4 7 and requires
commitment to what today is often called "ethics in government."148
Anticipating the more complete development of such principles in later
eras,"' the 1215 Magna Carta contained a trove of anti-corruption
provisions. Though framed in terms of addressing the realities of life in
early thirteenth century England, those provisions were driven by the same
types of concerns that inspire modern champions of the Rule of Law to
fight official corruption eight centuries later.
A. Justice Will Not Be Sold, Delayed, or Denied
Clause 40 is the shortest and most elegant provision in the Magna Carta.
In language that still glows with ethical clarity, it provides:
To no one will we sell, to no one [will we] deny or delay right or
justice. 150
Bribery of the King and his judges,' 5 ' and delays in rendering
146. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 68 ("The Rule of Law demands proper conduct on the part of
governmental actors."); see also Ken Gormley, An Orginal Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97
MICH. L. REv. 601, 627 n.109 (1998) ("In each of the Nation's two major scandals during the past
half century, Teapot Dome and Watergate, the appointment of a special prosecutor was essential to
preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system and public confidence in the [R]ule of [L]aw."
(citing FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 93-987, at 80-81 (1974))).
147. It is difficult to comprehensively define official corruption. See Vincent R. Johnson,
Corrption in Education: A Global Legal Challenge, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (distinguishing
between corruption and unethical conduct). However, the conduct must relate to the performance
of official duties. Cf id. at 4-6 (defining educational corruption). Presumably, official corruption
includes conduct by governmental actors that involves (1) serious criminal conduct; (2) tortious
conduct in the nature of fraud or intentional breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) conduct that betrays
the values that form the moral basis for governance, including the welfare of the community and
equal treatment of persons. See id. at 6 (enumerating the elements of corruption).
148. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, America's Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30
ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 729-30 (1999) ("[T]he enactment of codes of ethics governing the conduct of
public officials and public employees has become common ... [and those] who violate these rules
face a wide range of sanctions, including criminal prosecution, civil suits for damages, discipline, or
removal from office.").
149. See Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in Government at the Locallevel, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 715,
767 app. at 767-79 (2006) (containing a model code); see generally Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating
Lobbyists: Low, Ethics, and Public Pody, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 18-50 (2006) (discussing
prohibitions and disclosure requirements).
150. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 40.
151. The only fair reading of Clause 40 is that "we" refers to not only the King, but also the
judges of the royal courts. See BAKER, supra note 15, at 15 ("[The means of extending the [Kjing's
direct control of justice throughout the length and breadth of the realm was the practice of delegating
23
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judgment, had been serious problems in the decades leading up to the
barons' rebellion.152 The barons used this clause to take a stand against
such practices, which undercut the legitimacy of England's legal system. 153
During the subsequent centuries, Clause 40 has been interpreted as a
guarantee of equal justice under the law."' Today, the principle that
justice is not for sale is a cornerstone of the American rules of law
governing judicial conduct."55 Those rules broadly prohibit judges from
receiving gifts or other things of value from persons whose cases may
come before them.' 5 6
To say that justice is not for sale does not mean access to the courts is
free-except in the case of the indigent.' 55 Even centuries ago, it was an
accepted maxim that "the poor should have their writs for nothing."'
Otherwise, reasonable filing charges may be assessed.s1 5  What Clause 40
means is that access to an impartial justice system must be available to all
comers on equal terms.16 0  In King John's time, abusive practices had
arisen whereby some writs were granted to applicants "only as marks of
favour or after a bargain had been struck." 1 6 1 In certain instances,
creditors promised to remit to "the King a quarter or a third of the
debts"' 6 2 they hoped to recover, which obviously created a conflict of
interest that threatened to deprive alleged debtors of a fair day in royal
royal authority to trusted members of the [K]ing's own court.'). At the time of the Magna Carta,
there was nothing like the judicial independence that today in America separates the executive branch
from the judiciary. Cf MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASs'N 2010) ("A
judge shall uphold and promote the independence ... of the judiciary.').
152. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 30 (discussing how delays induced efforts to buy the King's
favor); see also id. at 34 ("[B]ribes ... swelled the [Kjing's coffers.").
153. See HINDLEY, supra note 17, at 96 (describing "the chief grievance of the baronage" as the
increase in dues to the king).
154. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 398 (providing "impartial justice to high and low").
155. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations of American judicial Independence, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007, 1020 (2002) (discussing the rules against gifts and excessive extra-judicial
compensation).
156. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3, r. 3.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010)
(prohibiting the acceptance of gifts as proscribed by law or "would appear to a reasonable person to
undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality").
157. See RANDY J. HOLLAND, MAGNA CARTA: MUSE & MENTOR 7 (2014) (recognizing the
roots of indigent access to the courts as principles of the Magna Carta).
158. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 397.
159. See id. at 395-96 (stating the thirteenth and twentieth centuries were similar in that courts
could assess reasonable costs).
160. See id. at 396 (balancing the need for indigent access with the court's right to charge
nominal fees).
161. Id. at 395.
162. Id. at 397 (quoting 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 174 (Cambridge, Univ. Press 1895)).
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court. These are the kinds of abusive practices that Clause 40 was
intended to prohibit and are condemned today by Rule of Law
jurisprudence.1 6 3
B. Improper Economic Benefit Is Prohibited
Three additional clauses in the 1215 Charter addressed other corrupt
official practices. Clause 28 provides:
No constable or other royal official shall take corn or other movable
goods from any man without immediate payment, unless the seller
voluntarily offers postponement of this. 1 64
Clause 30 states:
No sheriff, royal official, or other person shall take horses or carts for
transport from any free man, without his consent.1 6 5
Clause 31 provides:
Neither we nor any royal official will take wood for our castle, or for
any other purpose, without the consent of the owner.16 6
These provisions were intended to address abuses related to the royal
right of purveyance, the prerogative of the King to requisition supplies
from the citizenry as the royal court travelled about England as
"compelled by their administrative duties and induced by the pleasures of
the chase." 16 1 Purveyance was merely "a right of pre-emption; the
provisions . . . were to be paid for at the market rate . . . .",16 However, a
variety of abuses had developed in the years leading up to 1215. The
persons from whom supplies were requisitioned were often not paid, paid
too little, or paid too late.1 6 9  Other persons were paid "in exchequer
tallies," a despised form of currency that could be used only to pay
taxes.17 0
163. Cf James R. Pratt, III, Are We Being Fair to Our fudges and the Perception of Justice in Alabama
by Haing Partisan Elections for Judicial Office?, 72 ALA. LAW. 443, 444 (2011) ("mhe perception [that]
justice is for sale will undermine the [R]ule of [L]aw." (quoting Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword to
JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW PoLTICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
2000-2009: DECADE OF CHANGE (Charles Hall ed., 2010))).
164. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 28.
165. Id. at cl. 30.
166. Id. at cl. 31.
167. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 329.
168. Id. at 330.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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To the extent Clause 28 required prompt payments by the Crown for
goods legitimately requisitioned, it is similar to the "takings" clauses found
in later constitutional instruments which require payment when private
property is taken by the government.' 7 ' Clauses 30 and 31 further
restricted certain types of takings (horses, carts, and wood)-either by
officials or, in one case, by the Crown itself-that were particularly
harmful to the owners of goods.' 7 1
However, the abuses related to the right of purveyance included not
only takings to provide for the legitimate needs of the King's household,
but also requisitioning by officials for their "own personal ... needs."' 73
These three Clauses-28, 30, and 31-were intended to address that kind
of abuse, too.' 7 4 In doing so, these Clauses presaged the development of
a broader, fundamental principle of modern government ethics
jurisprudence.' 7 s That principle holds that a government official or
employee may not use official power for personal economic benefit.1 7 1
The threats to the Rule of Law posed by that type of self-interested
conduct are ones that must be addressed in every country and generation.
Indeed, in England, issues related to the right of purveyance continued for
at least four centuries, ensnaring ordinary persons, members of Parliament,
and kings.'
C. Officials Must Be Accountable
The good government principles inherent in the Rule of Law mean that
public officials and employees must be accountable for corrupt
practices.'s In modern societies, the procedures for ensuring official
171. For example, in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens, "[t]akings of
property by the state are conditioned on 'just indemnity."' Vincent R. Johnson, The Declaraion of the
Rights of Man and of Citiens of 1789, the Reign of Terror, and the Revoludionary Tribunal of Paris, 13 BOSTON
COLL. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 7 (1990). That provision was similar, but not identical, to language
in a few early American state constitutions. Id. at 1, 45 n.27.
172. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 30-31.
173. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 331.
174. Id.
175. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 28, 30-31 (limiting various officials' ability to
confiscate certain possessions from any free man without compensation or agreement).
176. See, e.g., SAN ANTONIo, TEX. CODE OF ETHICS § 2-43 (2014), http://www.san
antonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/Ethics/2013EthicsCode.pdf ('To avoid the appearance and risk of
impropriety, a City official or employee shall not take any official action that he or she knows is likely
to affect the economic interests of: (1) The official or employee .....
177. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 330.
178. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even more
important than the method of selecting the people's rulers and their successors is the character of the
constraints imposed on the Executive by the [R]ule of [L]aw."); Michael S. Ariens, American 1egal
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accountability often involve criminal indictment' 7 9 or impeachment. 1 8 0
The Great Charter sought to achieve the same goal of accountability
through procedures that reflected the balance of powers in thirteenth
century England."' Thus, the barons extracted from King John a
promise in Clause 55:
All fines that have been given to us unjustly and against the law of the
land, and all fines that we have exacted unjustly, shall be entirely remitted or
the matter decided by a majority judgment of the twenty-five barons referred
to below in the clause for securing the peace (§ 61) together with Stephen,
archbishop of Canterbury, if he can be present, and such others as he wishes
to bring with him. If the archbishop cannot be present, proceedings shall
continue without him, provided that if any of the twenty-five barons has
been involved in a similar suit himself, his judgment shall be set aside, and
someone else chosen and sworn in his place, as a substitute for the single
occasion, by the rest of the twenty-five.' 8 2
Another provision in the 1215 Magna Carta purported to spell out
certain limits of royal authority.' 8 Clause 12 provides:
No 'scutage" 8 4 or 'aid, 18 5 [kinds of taxes] may be levied in our
kingdom without its general consent, unless it is for the ransom of our
person, to make our eldest son a knight, and (once) to marry our eldest
daughter. For these purposes only a reasonable 'aid' may be levied. 'Aids'
from the city of London are to be treated similarly.' 8 6
Clause 12, had it been implemented, would have greatly limited the
Ethics in an Age of.Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 343, 344-45 (2008) ('The [R]ule of [L]aw constrains
lawgivers."). But see Ramsey Clark, Foreword to MIMI CLARK GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
TOM C. CLARK: A LIFE OF SERVICE, at xiii (2010) ("Without honorable servants, the [R]ule of [L]aw
is lost.'.
179. See Gerald S. Reamey, The Rule of Law, Not Politics, Will Determine Indictment Outcome, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014, 1:13 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/
commentary/article/The-rule-of-law-not-politics-will-determine-5765151.php (discussing the
indictment of the governor of Texas for alleged abuse of power).
180. See Jonathan Turley, Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the
Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 735, 790 n.279 (1999) (stating that in the
1800s, "Justice Story noted the dual value of impeachment as both a check and a reaffirmation of the
[R]ule of [L]aw.").
181. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 455 (describing the procedure for resolving legal
disputes regarding fines and penalties).
182. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 55.
183. See id. at cl. 12 (limiting the Crown's ability to levy taxes).
184. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
186. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 12 (internal footnotes added).
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Crown's ability to raise money.'1 7 However, this provision from the 1215
Charter was permanently dropped when the Magna Carta was reissued in
1216.188 Although it is difficult to characterize Clause 12 as a limitation
on royal authority in the form of an anti-corruption measure, it
foreshadowed the struggle between the Crown and its American colonies
more than five centuries later over the issue of unconsented taxation."'
IV. INSTITUTIONAL RESPECTABILITY
The Rule of Law demands a legal system operate in a manner that
merits the respect and confidence of the citizenry.' 90 The 1215 Magna
Carta contained several clauses that undoubtedly contributed to this goal
by addressing issues related to official qualifications, judicial jurisdiction,
the location of court sessions, and remedies.2' 1
A. JudicialQualiications
The institutional respectability of any legal system depends in large
measure on whether judges are qualified to perform judicial functions.' 92
In many places, it is taken for granted judges will be learned in the law.
However, even today, this is not always the case. One of the great
obstacles to the development of a modern legal system in China has been
the fact that, until recently, the Chinese judicial ranks were filled by retired
military officers with no legal training and little judicial temperament.' 9 3
187. McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 232.
188. See id. at 233 (noting that Clause 12 was omitted "from all reissues"). Clause 14 of the
1215 Magna Carta addressed the implementation of Clause 12. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at
cl. 14 (quoted at supra note 27) (describing the process of obtaining "the general consent of the
realm"). The substance and language of Clause 14 did not appear in later reissued versions of the
Magna Carta. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 255 (noting the omission from subsequent
confirmations).
189. But see MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 232, 240 ("It came indeed to be interpreted in a
broad general sense by enthusiasts who ... found in it the modern doctrine that the Crown can
impose no financial burden on the people without consent of Parliament .... [However,] [tlhis
famous clause was far from formulating any doctrine of self-taxation .. ).
190. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 75 ("This is true because the success of a peaceful substitute
for unlawful forms of dispute resolution depends upon the perceived legitimacy of the alternative.").
191. STENTON, supra note 57, at 14.
192. See Lawrence N. Gray, Ballot Rgging- How It's Done in New York, 85 N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2013,
at 32, 34 (2013) (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 212-13 (2008)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The [R]ule of [Law, which is a foundation of freedom,
presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its professional attainments and
the absolute probity of its judges.")); see also Rachel Paine Caufield, The Curious Lagic ofJudidal Eledions,
64 ARK. L REv. 249, 278 (2011) ("Merit selection . . . ensure[s] a qualified and neutral judicial branch
consistent with our principled commitment to the [Riule of [Law.").
193. See William Heye, Forum Selection for International Dispute Resolution in China-Chinese Courts
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Because judicial qualifications were also problems in Medieval England,
Clause 45 was included in the Great Charter:
We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or other officials, only
men that know the law of the realm and are minded to keep it well.' 9 4
This provision held out the promise of "honest and learned judges."'
To be sure, Clause 45 was short on specifics as to how the qualifications of
candidates for judicial positions would be assessed.' 9 6  Moreover, there
are differences of opinion about what the drafters intended.1 97 Some
scholars have argued the barons meant "to secure the appointment of men
well versed in legal science." 1 9" Others have strongly disagreed, saying
that all the barons wanted was "plain Englishmen with a rough-and-ready
knowledge of insular usage, who would avoid arbitrary acts condemned by
the law."' 9 9 Regardless of the merits of these contentions, it is easy to see
that important questions had been raised relevant to the Rule of Law, even
though the barons' immediate concerns were rooted not in lofty abstract
principles but in resentment over the favoritism that had been shown by
King John to particular individuals.2 0 0 Clause 45 was an important step
on the road to the type of careful attention to the judicial qualifications,
selection, 2 0 1 and training that is so important to the modern Rule of
Law.2 0 2
vs. CIETAC, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535, 550 (2004) (footnotes omitted) ("Many
articles have pointed out that the military background and the low competency of Chinese judges
have prevented judges from being able to decide cases on their merits. . .. New judges are required
to pass a national exam, and former military judges are being phased out.").
194. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 45.
195. STENTON, supra note 57, at 14.
196. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 45.
197. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 431-32 (examining differing views of the drafters'
intentions).
198. See id. (discussing the views of Bishop William Stubbs).
199. See id. at 432 (offering his own views).
200. See id. at 431 (naming Peter de Roches and Engelard de Cogogne).
201. See Vincent R. Johnson, Judge Bernard S. Meyer First Merit Appointee to the New York Court of
Appeals, 75 ALB. L. REv. 963, 967-71 (2012) (discussing improved selection of judges for the highest
court in New York State).
202. See Norman L. Greene, Advancing the Rule of Law Through judicial Selection Reform: Is the New
York Court ofAppeals Judical Selection Process the Least of Our Concerns in New York?, 72 ALB. L. REV. 633,
635 (2009) ("One of the key purposes of a judicial selection system is to select a judiciary in a manner
most conducive to establishing the [R]ule of [L]aw."); see also Gail Vaughn Ashworth, The Voice ofthe
Profession, 45 TENN. B.J., July 2009, at 3, 3 ("[qontinuation of a merit selection and retention election
judicial selection system in Tennessee was one of the top three action items identified as critically
important by the multidisciplinary participants in the October 2008 TBA [Tennessee Bar
Association] Rule of Law Conference."); Judicial Selection in Minnesota: A Special Report, 64 BENCH & B.
MINN., Apr. 2007, http://mnbenchbar.com/2007/04/judicial-selection ("[J]udicial campaigns have
29
ST. MARY'S IA WJOURNAL
B. Jurisdiction
A corollary to the idea that judges must be knowledgeable and
temperamentally disposed to judging is the idea that judicial tasks should
be performed only by judges.2 0 3 Otherwise, litigants are likely to be
harmed by the actions of unqualified judicial interlopers.2 04
To address this concern the barons included, as Clause 24 of the 1215
Charter, this language:
No sheriff, constable, coroners, or other royal officials are to hold
lawsuits that should be held by the royal justices. 2 0 5
From a modern perspective, it is easy to applaud this provision. It can
be argued the Clause was sound because it was likely to advance the
separation of powers and consequently, judicial independence. 2 0 6
Americans typically regard judicial independence as an indispensable
component of the Rule of Law,2 0 7 even though that argument finds little
support in countries such as China.2 08  In addition, Clause 24 can be
praised on the ground that it avoids the conflicts of interest that would
inevitably arise if a sheriff responsible for an arrest was charged with
deciding the guilt of the accused.
However, it is important to remember separation of powers and judicial
independence were ideas, which, if known at all, were not well developed,
in thirteenth century England. Until the reign of Henry II (1154-1189),
"all departments of government were centered in the King's
household." 2 09 To argue Clause 24 was intended to advance separation of
powers and judicial independence would be to place more weight on the
the potential to threaten the very foundation of our constitutional democracy and the [R]ule of
[L]aw.').
203. See Greene, supra note 202, at 636-37 (noting the "judicial selection system does not
operate alone').
204. Similar issues arise with respect to unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers. See
Zachary C. Zurek, The Limited Power of the Bar to Protect Its Monopoly, 3 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. &
ETHICS 242, 279 (2013) ("[Nonlawyer activities that flirt with the practice of law... [may have]
potential for harm" to the public.).
205. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 24.
206. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 71 (noting "American conceptions of the Rule of Law focus
on the importance of judicial independence").
207. See id. ("No ideal has been more deeply associated with the American justice system.").
208. See id at 90 C'Courts [in China] are viewed not as a separate branch of government with a
duty to check and balance the actions of other branches, but rather as administrative agencies
designed to carry out governmental policy.").
209. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 262. "The entire machinery of royal justice followed
Henry 11., as he passed, sometimes on the impulse of the moment, from one of his favourite hunting
seats to another." Id.
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prohibition than its slender text will bear.2 1 0
It is also important to remember that, at the time of the Magna Carta,
the duties of sheriffs, constables, and coroners were not defined the same
way they are today.2 1 1 Sheriffs traditionally performed certain judicial
functions, 2 1 2 while constables, coroners, and bailiffs performed a range of
tasks so wide and varying it is difficult to generalize their roles.2 1 3
McKechnie argues that Clause 24 was not intended to strip all royal
officials, other than royal justices, of judicial jurisdiction. 2 14  Rather, he
says, it simply meant that grave crimes could be tried only before royal
justices. 2 15 If that is true, the most that can be said is that Clause 24 was a
step towards clarifying judicial jurisdiction, which was consistent with the
modern understanding of the Rule of Law.
However, the 1215 Magna Carta contained another provision related to
judicial jurisdiction. Clause 34 stated:
The writ called preaipe21 6 shall not in [the] future be issued to anyone in
respect of any holding of land, if a free man could thereby be deprived of
the right of trial in his own lord's court.2 17
This provision was drafted against the background of the ongoing
struggle that reflected the expanding jurisdiction of the royal courts and
the diminishing power of the local feudal courts.2 18  According to
McKechnie, this was not a minor procedural reform. 2 19  Rather, "the
210. See id. at 265 (tracing the long evolution of legal institutions from a common action).
211. See id. at 313, 316 (examining the sheriff and coroner positions in England).
212. See id. at 309 ("[B]oth before and after the granting of the Charter, the sheriff exercised
criminal jurisdiction,. . . . heard indictments[,] and then condemned and punished petty offenders in
a summary manner.").
213. See id. at 314-17 (discussing the roles and functions of constables, coroners, and bailiffs).
214. See id. at 310 (claiming the Magna Carta was only declaratory of existing practice).
215. See id. ("All that Magna Carta did was to insist that no sheriff or local magistrate should
encroach on the province reserved for the royal justices, namely the final 'trying' of such grave crimes
as had now come to be recognized as 'pleas of the Crown.".
216. See Praeape, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("At common law, a writ ordering
a defendant to do some act or to explain why inaction is appropriate."). Praeaie can alternatively be
spelled, as it is in Clause 34,prrape. See id ("Also spelledpreabe.").
217. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 34 (emphasis added) (internal footnote added).
218. See CHARLES A. KEIGWIN, CASES IN COMMON LAW PLEADING 7 (1924) (discussing the
"juridical revolution" under Henry 11 (1154-1189), which greatly expanded the jurisdiction of the
King's courts); see also BAKER, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that during the reigns leading up to the
Magna Carts, "the provision of law and order was profitable"); see also Turner, supra note 9, at 49
("Litigation in the courts . . . was a source of large revenues to the governing body through whom the
courts function[ed], and thereupon a sharp conflict arose between the ecclesiastics, the King[,] and
the [b]arons as to their respective jurisdictions . . . ").
219. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 346 (emphasizing Clause 34 "proved [to be] a vital
factor in the history of royal jurisdiction in England").
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barons gained something of infinitely greater value" because Clause 34
reversed "a line of policy vigorously pursued [by kings] for half a
century." 220  However, there is no reason to think the operations of the
feudal courts were more consistent with the Rule of Law than the
operation of the royal courts.22 ' Indeed, the contrary seems more likely.
Consequently, the lesson that relates to the Rule of Law is subtle. Unlike
the writ of right, which allowed the royal courts to interfere with the
operation of feudal courts only in cases where they had failed to do justice,
the writ praedipe did not require an "allegation of failure of justice but
simply ignored the lord's jurisdiction" 22 2 by ordering the sheriff to
command the tenant to deliver disputed land to another or to "appear
before the royal court to explain his reasons for disobedience." 22
Jurisdictional disputes between courts are inevitable, but they must be
sorted out based on principle.2 2 1 In a world where kings and judges were
often bribed, a procedure like the writpraecze-by which a "feudal lord ...
was ... robbed by the King of his jurisdiction," 22 -invited abuse. That
type of legal mechanism undermines the foundations of the Rule of
Law.22 It was therefore appropriate for the Magna Carta to curb that
practice.
C. Accessibility and Transparency
The Rule of Law demands that justice be both accessible2 2 ' and
.228transparent. Thus, it is not surprising The World Justice Project
220. Id.
221. See Turner, supra note 9, at 49 ("[he... people were subjected to the oppression[] not
only of the King but of the Barons and their overlords as well.").
222. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 347.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 346-48 (detailing the methods employed by kings to obtain jurisdiction over pleas
without violating a principle, which only allowed interference on the grounds for a failure of justice).
225. Id. at 348.
226. See id. (exploring the "excellent opportunities for the insidious encroachments of the royal
courts at the behest of powerful kings").
227. See Mariana Hernandez Crespo G., From Noise to Music: The Potential of the Muli-Door
Courthouse (Casas De Jusida) Model to Advance Systemic Inclusion and Paniaation as a Foundation for
Sustainable Rule of Law in Latin America, 2012 J. DiSP. REsOL. 335, 358 ("[E]xperts seem to agree that
for the [R]ule of [Liaw to be advanced in any society, there must be widespread access to justice.");
see also Charles P. Kindregan & Edward M. Swartz, The Assault on the Captive Consumer Emasculating the
Common Law of Torts in the Name of Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 673, 693 (1987) ("The right of access to
the courts is inherent in the fundamental notion of due process which has guided the common law
since the days of the Magna Carta.").
228. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 406-07 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (warning of the consequences of excluding the public from
a suppression hearing), superseded by statute, FED. R. EviD. 104(a), as recogniged in Bourjaily v. United
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defines the Rule of Law as requiring "a robust and accessible process in
which rights and responsibilities based in law are enforced impartially." 22 9
Nor is it surprising the former Lord Chief Justice and President of the
Courts of England and Wales, Sir Igor Judge, stated that, "I]n any society
which embraces the [R]ule of [L]aw, it is an essential requisite of the
criminal justice system that it should be administered in public and subject
to public scrutiny." 2 3 0
1. The Problems of Peripatetic Justice
It can be difficult for a court to be accessible and transparent if it is
continually on the move.23 1 However, until the late twelfth century, it was
the custom of the royal courts to travel with the King as he handled the
realm's affairs. 23 2  This often forced litigants and observers to traverse
great distances and incur substantial expenses in order to participate in
court proceedings.2 33  According to Stenton, "This tiresome travelling in
pursuit of the [K]ing's judges was as tedious in some trivial suit for a few
acres of land as it was burdensome for litigants following up an important
and fiercely contested plea before the King himself."23
As early as 1178, Henry II had established a fixed bench at
Westminster. 23 5  However, that did not resolve the problems related to a
States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987). According to justice Harry Blackmun,
[O]pen judicial processes, especially in the criminal field, protect against judicial, prosecutorial,
and police abuse; provide a means for citizens to obtain information about the criminal justice
system and the performance of public officials; and safeguard the integrity of the courts.
Publicity is essential to the preservation of public confidence in the [R]ule of [Llaw and in the
operation of courts.
Id. at 448.
229. Sara Beezley, Rule ofLav Conference Held at Kansas Histog Center, 77 J. KAN. B. Ass'N, July-
Aug. 2008, at 22, 22.
230. Frank Richardson, The E-Jusice Revolution, 64 INT'L B. NEWS, Oct. 2010, at 37, 38 (quoting
Sir Igor Judge).
231. See McKEcHNIE, supra note 16, at 262 (illustrating the "intolerable delay, annoyance, and
expense" of common pleas that had "to follow the King from place to place").
232. See BAKER, supra note 15, at 16 ("Every so often a 'general eyre' would visit a
county . . . ."); id. at 15 (noting "travelling justices" formed a nucleus of "justices of all England").
During the reign of Henry 11 (1154-1189), "the coming of the itinerant justices [who travelled
without the King] took place only at intervals of about seven years." MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at
306.
233. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 262 (detailing the case of Richard of Anesty, who
followed the King for five years and incurred substantial traveling debt); see also BAKER, supra note 15,
at 16 (referring to the "detailed picture" left by "one litigant who sought royal justice").
234. STENTON, supra note 57, at 12.
235. See McKEcHNIE, supra note 16, at 265 (indicating that some "common pleas still 'followed
the King' because Henry II set apart five judges who were instructed not to leave his court).
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peripatetic court system.2 3 6  The practices at Westminster changed and in
any event, the royal courts included not only the justices who traditionally
travelled with the King but also other varieties of royally dispatched
"itinerant justices."" Thus, the problems caused by court movement
continued. To address the issues related to the convenience and cost of
litigation, three provisions were inserted into the Magna Carta.2 8
Clause 17 provides:
Ordinary lawsuits shall not follow the royal court around, but shall be
held in a fixed place.2 39
Though no particular place was named, Westminster was "probably
intended."240 Presumably this is why, years later, Sir Frederick Pollock
wrote, "We may al[most] say that [the] Magna Carta gave England a
capital." 241 Clause 17 made clear King John was not to try common pleas
other than at the fixed location.2 4 2  However, royal pleas, in which the
Crown had a special interest, were treated differently.24 3 They continued
to travel with the King, at least as late as 1300 in the reign of Edward I.244
236. In the current digital age, the challenges posed by distance to the administration of justice
have been greatly reduced. Appearances and depositions can take place via Skype or similar Internet-
based video services. (In 2011, I gave an expert deposition via Skype; I was in Beijing; the lawyer
taking the deposition was in Los Angeles; and the lawyer defending it was in Dallas.). See generally
William R. Simpson, Jr. et al., The Invakdity of a Plea of Guilty to a Criminal Offense Made 1y Video
Teleconferencing When the Defendant Is Not Present in Open Court, 34 U. ARK. LITI1E ROCK L. Rev. 383,
383 (2012) ("The taking of guilty pleas from defendants in criminal cases by video
teleconferencing ... is becoming more common. . .. "). In addition, documents can be instantly
transmitted or accessed online. However, distance continued to pose great obstacles to court
operations until relatively recent times. See Johnson, supra note 201, at 1008-13 (discussing the
challenges faced by a judge on the New York state high court, circa 1980, whose judicial schedule
alternated between three weeks in midtown Manhattan and two weeks in Albany).
237. See STENTON, supra note 57, at 8 ("[Elvery few years ... itinerant justices ... sat in every
shire . . see also MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 270 (clarifying the distinction between the
itinerant justices and the judges who travelled with the King and those who settled at Westminster).
238. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 262 (noting Clause 17 attempted "to render royal
justice cheaper and more accessible"); id. at 277 (asserting the intent of Clause 18 was "to meet the
convenience of litigants"); see also id at 282 (discussing how Clause 19 supplemented Clause 18).
239. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 17. In another translation, the words translated here
as "ordinary lawsuits" were translated as "common pleas," and "common pleas" were defined as
"[1]aw-suits in which the Crown had no special interest." MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 261-63.
240. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 263.
241. Id. (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, The History of Engish Law as a Branch of Poiics, in
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 209 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1882)).
242. See id at 266 (noting, in 1215, it was considered an abuse for King John to try a common
plea somewhere other than Westminster).
243. See id. at 267 (contrasting common pleas with royal pleas).
244. Id.
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2. The Popular Petty Assizes
Henry II, John's father, was a legal innovator, perhaps the greatest in
English history.2 4 5 Among his reforms were three petty assizes: novel
disseisin,2 4 6 mort d'ancestor,24 7 and darrein presentment.2 48  These efficient2 49
dispute resolution mechanisms proved popular. They quickly resolved
questions about possession of real property even though they left ultimate
questions of ownership unresolved,2 50  pending possible later
determinations in proceedings before the more-cumbersome Grand
Assize.2 *
The barons' grievance was that the popular and efficient petty assizes
were too infrequent.25 2  To address this concern, Clause 18 of the 1215
Charter states:
Inquests of novel disseisin, mod d'ancestor, and darrein presentment shall be
taken only in their proper county court. We ourselves, or in our absence
abroad our chief justice, will send two justices to each county four times a
year, and these justices, with four knights of the county elected by the county
itself, shall hold the assizes in the county court, on the day and in the place
245. See PAUL JOHNSON, THE OFFSHORE ISLANDERS: ENGLAND'S PEOPLE FROM ROMAN
OCCUPATION TO THE PRESENT 86-87 (1972) (asserting that by embarking "on a vigorous policy of
law enforcement" and relying on "the ubiquity of a centrally administered system. . . [to] erode
regional variations .... Henry II carried out a legal revolution"); see also GOODHART, supra note 40,
at 7-8 (stating Henry II, "probably the greatest monarch in all English history," chose to unify the
nation through law).
246. An "assize" is "[a] session of a court or council." Assi.e, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). "Petty assizes were characterized by the form of the writ, which specified the
questions to be put to the panel, and ordered that a panel be assembled. The petty assizes were novel
disseisin, mort d'ancestor, utrmm, and darnin presentment." Id. An "assize of novel disseisin" involves the
issuance of "[a] writ for a tenant who has been disseised of lands and tenements." Id.
247. A trial mort d'ancestre involved the "death of the ancestor." Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 325 n.13 (1964).
248. "The assize of damin prsentment ... summoned a jury-like body called an 'assize' of twelve
free and lawful men from a particular location to resolve a question ... [of] which patron presented
the last parson who was now dead to the church in a stated village, which church was alleged to be
vacant and of which church the plaintiff claimed the advowson." Joshua C. Tate, Ownershrb and
Possession in the Ear# Common Law, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 280, 306-07 (2006) (emphasis added). This
question was important because it determined who was allowed to make the appointment to the
vacant post, which might afford "a living for a younger son or needy relative." MCKECHNIE, supra
note 16, at 276.
249. See, e.,g., MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 275 (writing that novel disseisin "was a rapid and
peaceable method of ascertaining,... whether an alleged recent eviction had really taken place").
250. See id. at 274 ('These petty assizes, . . . related to questions of 'possession,' as opposed to
'ownership.".
251. See id. at 276 (evaluating the benefits and limitations of the petty assize of mort d'ancesto).
252. See id. at 276-77 (stating sessions were not held regularly or "often enough").
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where the court meets.2 5 3
Clause 19 further mandates:
If any assizes cannot be taken on the day of the county court, as many
knights and freeholders shall afterwards remain behind, of those who have
attended the court, as will suffice for the administration of justice, having
regard to the volume of business to be done.2 5 4
Together, Clauses 18 and 19 made popular legal procedures more
readily available and by doing so, recognized the fact that administration of
justice should be reasonably convenient 2 55 and subject to public
scrutiny.2 56 It matters little that it was quickly recognized that the new
procedures were too expensive and otherwise imperfect25 or that the
rules governing the frequency and place of court sessions soon
changed.25" Those later modifications simply illustrate that any legal
system must continually struggle with the question of how to make justice
optimally available in a world of limited resources. The provisions in the
Magna Carta make clear "the King had been forced to look at the working
of his courts purely from the litigants' point of view," 25 9 which was
something revolutionary. The three above-named provisions-Clauses 17,
18, and 19-are consistent with the modern understanding of the Rule of
Law because they were committed to the idea that justice should be
accessible and affordable. 2 60
3. Undermining Trial by Combat
Clause 36 of the 1215 Charter advanced the administration of justice in
the medieval world in ways consistent with the modern Rule of Law.
Clause 36 provides:
In [the] future nothing shall be paid or accepted for the issue of a writ
of inquisition of life or limbs. It shall be given gratis, and not refused.2 6 '
253. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 18 (emphasis added).
254. Id. at cl. 19.
255. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 277 ("No inquiry of the kind was to be held elsewhere
than in the county where the property was situated. This was intended to meet the convenience of
litigants... .").
256. See id. at 282-83 (requiring "assizes in the normal case should be held in the county
court ... was a salutary provision, since a healthy publicity accompanied the proceedings").
257. See id. at 277 ("Within two years it was seen that this provision went too far.").
258. See id. ("The Charter of 1217 ... provided that circuits should be made only once a year.").
259. STENTON, supra note 57, at 13.
260. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 262 (noting Clause 17 attempted "to render royal justice
cheaper and more accessible").
261. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 36.
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This reform was important. In the twelfth century, trial by combat-
which sometimes amounted to nothing more than "legalized private
revenge"262-was an established, 2 63 but despised, method for resolving
disputes. Henry II did not abolish trial by combat entirely but set upon a
course designed to undermine it.2 6 4 To do this, he invented the writ of
inquisition.2 65 That writ allowed certain criminal defendants to avoid, or
at least delay, trial by combat while a diversionary procedure played out.
As explained by McKechnie, that procedure allowed the accused "to refer
the question of guilt or innocence to the verdict of his neighbours." 2 6 6
Thus, under the writ of inquisition, a preliminary plea was made to "twelve
recognitors." 2 67  "If his neighbours upheld the plea, further proceedings
were quashed," and trial by combat was avoided.2 6' Eventually, "the
main issue of guilt or innocence, not merely the preliminary pleas, came to
be determined by the neighbours' verdict, which was treated as final." 2 6 9
The problem during King John's reign was that the writ of inquisition
was used not to save the innocent from the capricious process of trial by
combat but as an important source of revenue. Thus, the writ was sold
only to those with deep purses.2 7 0  Not only was justice sold-and at a
high price-but it was sold with full knowledge that those who could not
afford to buy a writ of inquisition would be relegated to the vicissitudes of
the widely scorned system of trial by combat.
Consequently, Clause 38, which made the writ freely available,2 7 1 was
laudable on many counts.2 7 2 It moved the legal system toward processes
under which decisions would be based on relevant evidence rather than
physical might. It limited the corrupt practices of selling justice only to the
262. McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 360.
263. See id. at 359 ("'Combat' became the normal mode of deciding pleas among the upper
classes.").
264. See id. at 360 ("[Henry] would gladly have abolished ... [trial by combat], but followed the
more subtle policy of undermining its vitality.'.
265. See id. at 359 ("The writ ... had been invented by Henry II. to obviate the judicial
duel..").
266. Id.
267. Id. at 362.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 363 ("John ... listened only to suitors with long purses . ... ").
271. See id ("John's acceptance of ... [the barons' demands that the writ should be issued free
of charge to all who needed it] was repeated in all reissues, [of the Magna Carta] and apparently
observed in practice.").
272. But see McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 362 (opining Clause 36 is erroneously given credit
for being a "direct antecedent" of habeas corpus).
ST. MARY'S LAWJO URNAL
wealthy. And, it made access to justice accessible to everyone who was
subject to a criminal charge that fell within the writ.
D. Prompt Remedies
Legal procedures do not comply with the Rule of Law if the
investigation of claims and the availability of remedies are unnecessarily
delayed.2  Six provisions in the 1215 Magna Carta demonstrate there
was a concern for the timeliness of remedies. 27 4  The most surprising of
these provisions imposed tight deadlines for the investigation and
abolition of certain "evil" customary practices. Clause 48 provides:
All evil customs relating to forests and warrens, foresters, warreners,
sheriffs and their servants, or river-banks and their wardens, are at once to
be investigated in every county by twelve sworn knights of the county, and
within forty days of their enquiry the evil customs are to be abolished
completely and irrevocably. But we, or our chief justice if we are not in
England, are first to be informed.2 7 5
Aside from this provision's unrealistic expectations about the speed
with which permanent remedies could be implemented to resolve
unspecified problems, it raises serious questions about the wisdom of
committing to local ad hoc groups the definition of "evil customs."2 76
King John commenced the implementation of this Clause as early as June
19, 1215, but the renewed civil war soon intervened and the provision was
not included in later reissues of the Magna Carta.2 77
A second provision concerning the promptness of remedies dealt with
the property of felons. Until "the Forfeiture Act of 1870 abolished
273. Justice Hassan B. Jallow offers a different perspective:
International standards help establish the Rule of Law by entrenching certain fundamental
principles ... such as the right to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which the
accused understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her ... and to be tried
in public and without undue delay.
Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Justice and the Rule of Law.- A Global Perspective, 43 INT'L LAW. 77, 78-79
(2009).
274. See general# Nancy Nowlin Kerr, Case Note, Sixth Amendment Rght to Speedy Trial Does Not
App# During Inteim Between Dismissal of Charges and Subsequent Indictment by Same Sovereign, 14 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 113, 114 (1982) (tracing the roots of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial back to
the Magna Carta).
275. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 48.
276. McKEcHNIE, supra note 16, at 440.
277. See id ('The dangerous experiment of leaving the definition to local juries in each district
was not repeated").
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'corruption of blood27 ' and deprived the Crown of all interest in the
estate of felons,"27 9 the Crown had an interest in the land and chattels of
a convicted felon. However, that right was limited and after a year and a
day, "[c]ustom gave the felon's land to his feudal lord, and his chattels to
the lord who tried him." 28 0  To address John's abuse of these rights,
Clause 32 imposed a strict deadline that conformed to custom. It states:
We will not keep the lands of people convicted of felony in our hand
for longer than a year and a day, after which they shall be returned to the
lords of the 'fees' concerned.
A third provision, Clause 52, established a general principle that
required prompt remedies for violations of rights, but with a significant
exception that was applicable to certain cases if King John was on a
Crusade. In his developing struggle with the disaffected barons, John
cloaked himself with the protection of Pope Innocent III by pledging
fealty and promising---disingenuously-to become a crusader.28 2  Clause
52 provides:
To any man whom we have deprived or dispossessed of lands, castles,
liberties, or rights, without the lawful judgment of his equals, we will at once
restore these. In cases of dispute the matter shall be resolved by the
judgment of the twenty-five barons referred to below in the clause for
securing the peace (5 61). In cases, however, where a man was deprived or
dispossessed of something without the lawful judgment of his equals by our
father King Henry or our brother King Richard, and it remains in our hands
or is held by others under our warranty, we shall have respite for the period
[three years 2 8 3] commonly allowed to Crusaders, unless a lawsuit had been
begun, or an enquiry had been made at our order, before we took the Cross
as a Crusader. On our return from the Crusade, or if we abandon it, we will
at once render justice in ful.2 84
278. "Corruption of blood" is defined as "[a] defunct doctrine, now considered
unconstitutional, under which a person loses the ability to inherit or pass property as a result of an
attainder [conviction] or of being declared civilly dead." Corp tion of Blood, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
279. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 342.
280. Id. at 337.
281. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 32.
282. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 58 (discussing John's token gestures to fulfil his vow); see
also MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 449 (noting the barons viewed John's vow as "notorious
perjury").
283. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 449.
284. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 52. Clause 61, which deals with securing the peace
provides,
SINCE WE HAVE GRANTED ALL THESE THINGS for God, for the better ordering of
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In a fourth provision concerned with timeliness, the "crusade
exception" was also applied to the resolution of legal disputes involving
forests and certain other matters. There were many such controversies2 8 s
because, over the course of several reigns, English kings had appropriated
forests for their exclusive use as sources of wealth and recreation.2 8 6 The
our kingdom, and to allay the discord that has arisen between us and our barons, and since we
desire that they shall be enjoyed in their entirety, with lasting strength, for ever, we give and
grant to the barons the following security:
The barons shall elect twenty-five of their number to keep, and cause to be observed with all
their might, the peace and liberties granted and confirmed to them by this charter.
If we, our chief justice, our officials, or any of our servants offend in any respect against any
man, or transgress any of the articles of the peace or of this security, and the offence is made
known to four of the said twenty-five barons, they shall come to us-or in our absence from
the kingdom to the chief justice-to declare it and claim immediate redress. If we, or in our
absence abroad the chief justice, make no redress within forty days, reckoning from the day on
which the offence was declared to us or to him, the four barons shall refer the matter to the rest
of the twenty-five barons, who may distrain upon and assail us in every way possible, with the
support of the whole community of the land, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions, or
anything else saving only our own person and those of the queen and our children, until they
have secured such redress as they have determined upon. Having secured the redress, they may
then resume their normal obedience to us.
Any man who so desires may take an oath to obey the commands of the twenty-five barons
for the achievement of these ends, and to join with them in assailing us to the utmost of his
power. We give public and free permission to take this oath to any man who so desires, and at
no time will we prohibit any man from taking it. Indeed, we will compel any of our subjects
who are unwilling to take it to swear it at our command.
If one of the twenty-five barons dies or leaves the country, or is prevented in any other way
from discharging his duties, the rest of them shall choose another baron in his place, at their
discretion, who shall be duly sworn in as they were.
In the event of disagreement among the twenty-five barons on any matter referred to them
for decision, the verdict of the majority present shall have the same validity as a unanimous
verdict of the whole twenty-five, whether these were all present or some of those summoned
were unwilling or unable to appear.
The twenty-five barons shall swear to obey all the above articles faithfully, and shall cause
them to be obeyed by others to the best of their power.
We will not seek to procure from anyone, either by our own efforts or those of a third parry,
anything by which any part of these concessions or liberties might be revoked or diminished.
Should such a thing be procured, it shall be null and void and we will at no time make use of it,
either ourselves or through a third party.
Id.
285. See STENTON, supra note 57, at 8 ("[Rloyal forests . . . necessitated another series of courts,
[which were] extremely unpopular. . . .").
286. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tibal Enironmental Pohy in an Era of Sef-Determinaion: The Role of
Ethics, Economics, and Traditonal Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REv. 225, 255 (1996) ("Although for
many years the forests were used for recreational hunting by the sovereign, in later years British
monarchs built ships with the timber and offered it for sale to build new empires across the sea."
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royal appropriation of forests seriously interfered with the ability of
commoners to forage for food and fuel. Clause 53 provides:
We shall have similar respite in rendering justice in connexion with
forests that are to be disafforested,28 or to remain forests, when these were
first afforested by our father Henry or our brother Richard; with the
guardianship of lands in another person's 'fee,' when we have hitherto had
this by virtue of a 'fee' held of us for knight's service by a third party; and
with abbeys founded in another person's 'fee,' in which the lord of the 'fee'
claims to own a right. On our return from the Crusade, or if we abandon it,
we will at once do full justice to complaints about these matters.2 8 8
Finally, Clauses 56 and 57 indicated that Welshmen were entitled to
prompt remedies. The crusade exception was incorporated into Clause 57,
which dealt with deprivations attributable to King John's predecessors, but
not into Clause 56, which addressed the actions of King John himself.
Clause 56 provides:
If we have deprived or dispossessed any Welshmen of lands, liberties,
or anything else in England or in Wales, without the lawful judgment of their
equals, these are at once to be returned to them. A dispute on this point
shall be determined in the Marches by the judgment of equals. English law
shall apply to holdings of land in England, Welsh law to those in Wales, and
the law of the Marches to those in the Marches. The Welsh shall treat us
and ours in the same way.2 8 9
Clause 57 states:
In cases where a Welshman was deprived or dispossessed of anything,
without the lawful judgment of his equals, by our father King Henry or our
brother King Richard, and it remains in our hands or is held by others under
our warranty, we shall have respite for the period commonly allowed to
Crusaders, unless a lawsuit had been begun, or an enquiry had been made at
our order, before we took the Cross as a Crusader. But on our return from
the Crusade, or if we abandon it, we will at once do full justice according to
the laws of Wales and the said regions.2 9 0
Together, these six provisions-Clauses 32, 48, 52, 53, 56, and 57-
demonstrate there was a concern for the promptness of justice that is in
(citing F.A. INDERWICK, THE KING'S PEACE: A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ENGLISH LAW
COURTS 139 (London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1895))).
287. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; LINEBAUGH, supra note 31, at 31 ("To disafforest
meant to remove from royal jurisdiction; it did not mean to clear-cut timber or destroy the trees.").
288. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 53 (internal foomote added).
289. Id. at cl. 56.
290. Id at cl. 57.
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keeping with the demands of the Rule of Law as that concept is
understood today.
V. RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY
The Rule of Law demands that legal rules and practices respect human
dignity.2 9 1 The 1215 Magna Carta did so in two ways: first, by endorsing
the idea of proportionality of punishment; and second, by addressing the
needs of some of the most vulnerable persons."'
A. Propordionality
Proportionality of punishment is an important concern in twenty-first
century jurisprudence, generally,2 9 3 and in Rule of Law jurisprudence, in
particular.2 94 Similar concerns were addressed, in eloquent terms, in the
1215 Magna Carta. Clause 20 states:
For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion to the
degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly, but not so
heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood. In the same way, a merchant
291. See Thomas v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd., 245 F. Supp. 601, 604 (W.D. La. 1965) ("[I]he
[Rlule of [L]aw demands recognition of each individual's claim to basic human dignity."); see also
Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 399-400 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (treating innocence as "a
mere technicality. . . would miss the point" because "[in a society devoted to the [R]ule of [Law, the
difference between violating or not violating a criminal statute cannot be shrugged aside as a minor
detail'.
292. See Craig M. Jacobs, Comment, The Constitutionaky of Collateral Post-Coniction Claims of
Actual Innocence, 42 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455, 488 n.138 (2011) ('The basic concept of the Eighth
Amendment, which is 'nothing less than the dignity of man,' finds its roots in the Magna Carta."
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958))).
293. See Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Cnminal Punishment, and Proponionaty: The Importance
of Ligislaive Limits, 41 CONN. L. REv. 109, 113 (2008) ("According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Constitution requires that punishment in its various forms ... be proportional to the wrongful
conduct that justifies punishment."); see also Gerald S. Reamey, The Growing Role of Fortuiy in Texas
Ciminal Law, 47 S. TEx. L. REV. 59, 64 (2005) ("[Plroportionality in punishment demands more
emphasis on culpability than on harm.").
294. See Michal Tamir, Pubc Law as a Whole and Normative Duakpy: Reclaiming Administrati
Insghts in Enforcement Reew, 12 TEX.J. C.L. & C.R. 43, 66 (2006) ('The principle of proportionality is
'at the heart of the European legal order and increasingly recognized as a key component in the
[R]ule of [Liaw' in many countries around the world." (quoting Michael Fordham & Thomas de la
Mare, Identifying the Pinciples of Prmportionaty, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES 27,
27 (Jeffrey Jowell & Jonathan Cooper eds., 2001))); see also Jamal Greene, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of
Standards, 99 GEo. L.J. 1289, 1293 n.31 (2011) ("David Beatty has called proportionality 'the ultimate
[R]ule of [L]aw' because he believes it 'is an integral, indispensable part of every constitution that
subordinates the system of government it creates to the [R]ule of [L]aw."' (quoting DAVID M.
BEATY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 160, 163 (2004))); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and the
CivlRights Agenda, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 125, 126 (2010) (calling for "a balanced appreciation for the
[R~ule of [Ljaw that includes valuation of proportionality, accountability, and fairness").
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shall be spared his merchandise, and a villein2 9 5 the implements of his
husbandry, if they fall upon the mercy of a royal court. None of these fines
shall be imposed except by the assessment on oath of reputable men of the
neighbourhood.2 9 6
This provision reflects a humane preference not to strip a person
convicted of a crime of the ability to earn a living.29 7  "[P]arallels have ...
been drawn between the livelihood-protection provisions of the Magna
Carta and state homestead laws,"298 which today protect certain items of
personal and real property from being taken to satisfy judgments.
The same proportionality principle was echoed in two other provisions
dealing with earls, barons, and ordained religious. Clause 21 provides:
Earls and barons shall be fined only by their equals, and in proportion
to the gravity of their offence.3 0 0
Clause 22 states:
A fine imposed upon the lay property of a clerk in holy orders shall be
assessed upon the same principles, without reference to the value of his
ecclesiastical benefice. 3 0
B. Legal Protection of the Vulnerable
In the feudal world, "much of the sovereign's revenue came from feudal
incidents resulting from the [K]ing's control of persons under disabilities,
the most well known of which were the wardships and marriages of.the
minor heirs of his tenants in chief."3 0 2 The 1215 Magna Carta contained
many provisions designed to reduce abuse of these royal privileges by
addressing the rights of widows, minors, and heirs, as well as the duties of
guardians.
295. Villein, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("[A] peasant occupier or
cultivator entirely subject to a lord ... or attached to a manor . . . .").
296. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 20 (internal footnote added).
297. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 292 (indicating the provision is usually interpreted as
reflecting a "humane desire not to reduce a poor wretch to absolute beggary").
298. Nicholas M. McLean, Livehood, Abikly to Pay, and the Onginal Meaning of the Excesive Fines
Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 898 n.227 (2013).
299. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(a) (West 2014) ("A homestead ... [is] exempt
from seizure for the claims of creditors . . . .").
300. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 21.
301. Id. at cl. 22.
302. State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 118 (W. Va. 1974).
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1. Widows and Surviving Children
In the words of Geoffrey Hindley, in the late twelfth and early
thirteenth centuries a widow "could be married at the wish of her feudal
overlord to any man willing to pay the going rate."30 However, in rare
cases, a widow was sufficiently wealthy to be able to outbid suitors and
buy a charter from her lord guaranteeing she would not be forced to
remarry.3 0 4 Rich widows were often eager to do so. 3 ' According to
McKechnie, the payments-which sometimes included chattels (such as
hunting animals) as well as money-"testif[ied] eloquently to the greed of
the King, the anxiety of the victims, and the extortionate nature of the
system." 30 6
According to historians Frances and Joseph Gies, "Until [the] Magna
Carta curbed the [K]ing's powers to sell the remarriage of widows, John
did a lively business in payments for the widow's privilege of remaining
single, of remarrying whom she wished, or of keeping control of the lives
and fortunes of her minor children." 307 In addition, the King made a
practice of "selling the hand of wealthy widows to the highest bidder." 308
These deeply resented practices 309 prompted calls for reform, and the
barons won concessions from King John in the Magna Carta.31 o
In Clauses 7 and 8 of the Charter, the language favoring widows is so
strong that it has caused some modern observers to call the 1215 Magna
Carta a landmark in the recognition of women's rights.31 Clause 8 states
with certainty:
No widow shall be compelled to marry, so long as she wishes to remain
without a husband. But she must give security that she will not marry
303. HINDLEY, supra note 17, at 167.
304. See id at 170 (discussing Alice, Countess of Warwick, in 1205).
305. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 220 ('Wealthy widows were glad to escape from John's
clutches by agreeing to buy up the Crown's rights for a lump sum.').
306. Id.
307. FRANCES GIES & JOSEPH GIES, WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE AGES 28 (1978).
308. R.H. Helmholz, Coninental Law and Common Law.- Historical Strangers or Companions?, 1990
DUKE L.J. 1207,1212.
309. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 212 ('The Crown's right to regulate the marriages of
wards had become an intolerable grievance.... [involving] maids of fourteen and widows alike.").
310. Id.
311. See HINDLEY, supra note 17, at 173 ("One commentator on Magna Carta wrote that one of
the great stages in the emancipation of women is to be traced to the Charter's provision that they
should not be distrained to marry for a second time without their consent.'). Presumably, KingJohn
despised Clauses 7 and 8 as much as the other parts of the Charter; however, it is possible that his
strong mother, Eleanor of Aquitaine, might have felt differently. See id. at 162 ("Eleanor's amazonian
entourage at the time of the Second Crusade had mesmerized European society.").
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without royal consent, if she holds her lands of the Crown, or without the
consent of whatever other lord she may hold them of.3 12
The victory for women was qualified. This was only a prohibition
against a forced second or subsequent marriage. Moreover, most widows
had no option other than to remarry because there were few career
opportunities. The alternatives were to face financial destitution 3 3 or
enter a nunnery, thus forfeiting their fiefs 3 1  and becoming "dead in the
eyes of the law." 3 1  Consequently, to evaluate fairly Clause 8, it is
important to focus on its notice and consent provisions, which preserved
the lords' rights, and to understand the nature of the barons' concerns.
"[T]he barons at Runnymede desired to place restrictions on the King,
not upon themselves." 3 1 '6 According to Hindley:
The barons did not object to the principle of .. . the sale of heiresses'
marriages: they too found them a valuable source of revenue in their own
domains. But they did object to John's penchant for marrying ladies of great
families to lowborn "new men" or even mercenary captains, either because
they simply had the money or as a reward for military services. 3
Thus, Clause 8 may have been rooted more in concerns about the
reputation and status of noble families than in solicitude for widows. 3 18
Such familial concerns are reflected in Clause 6 of the 1215 Magna Carta,
which provides:
Heirs may be given in marriage, but not to someone of lower social
standing. Before a marriage takes place, it shall be made known to the heir's
next-of-kin.
Clause 6 addressed in bland language an issue that must have provoked
outrage. 320 Moreover, the terms of Clause 6 were problematic. "Lower
social standing" was, and remains, an elusive concept. For a half century
312. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 8.
313. See HINDLEY, supra note 17, at 166 ("They ran the risk of virtual pauperdom.').
314. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 213 ("[Those who objected to mate with the men to
whom John sold them . .. might ... forfeit their fiefs to escape the burdens inherent in them . . ...
315. HINDLEY, supra note 17, at 167.
316. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 217.
317. HINDLEY, supra note 17, at 168.
318. See id. at 169 ("[Blaronial indignation was probably more through sympathy for the
nobility ... than because of personal feelings for the women themselves.'); id. at 165 (stating the
ability to choose a marriage partner "affected family politics among the nobility").
319. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 6.
320. See HINDLEY, supra note 17, at 168 (discussing how the term "disparagement" is often
translated to "loss of status" but the translation does not adequately convey the outrage felt against
KingJohn when he abused his power).
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after 1215,32 England debated the nuances of this question, including
whether forced marriage to a foreigner or a person with disabilities was
prohibited.3 2 2
At the time of the Magna Carta, "It was customary for a land-owner to
bestow marriage portions [of his land] on his daughters."3 23  In addition,
it was usual for a new husband to establish a dowry for his wife as they
were leaving the altar. If the husband failed to do so, the law stepped
in and remedied the omission by fixing the dower at one-third of his
lands.3 2 5  The problem for a widow was that she could enter into
possession of those lands only if she had the permission of the King, who
had superior rights and could seize everything. Clause 7 of the 1215
Charter addressed this dilemma:
At her husband's death, a widow may have her marriage portion and
inheritance at once and without trouble. She shall pay nothing for her
dower, marriage portion, or any inheritance that she and her husband held
jointly on the day of his death. She may remain in her husband's house for
forty days after his death, and within this period her dower shall be assigned
to her.3 2 7
This provision was important to women for it limited the King's
prerogative and affirmed the customary rule that a widow was entitled to a
third of her husband's lands for her lifetime.3 2 8  However, Clause 7 only
dealt with real property.3 2 9 Issues remained relating to personal property,
including food and other necessities. Those matters were expressly
addressed in the last sentence of Clause 26, which provided limited
321. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 77 ("[F]ifty years before 'disparagement' was precisely
defined....'D.
322. See HINDLEY, supra note 17, at 168 (discussing the various commentaries and concerns
regarding what the term "disparagement" meant).
323. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 216.
324. See id. at 215-16 (explaining the custom was to set aside the dowry for a bride on the
wedding day, which formed a picturesque backdrop to a marriage "taking place literally at the church
door').
325. See id. at 216 (stating the law stepped in "on the presumption that the omission had been
unintentional").
326. See id. at 215 (explaining how the King retained superior rights under the authority of
primer seisin).
327. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 7.
328. See GIES & GiEs, supra note 307, at 122 (explaining the Magna Carta codified the
customary practice); see also MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 215 (noting a widow "had a right. . . to
one-third of the lands of her husband ... in addition to any land she might have brought as a
marriage portion").
329. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 218 ("[Clause 7] says nothing ... [about] money or
chattels.. . .").
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protection to widows and surviving minor children by making clear that
their reasonable shares of a deceased man's estate would not be treated as
assets of the estate, except in cases of an unpaid debt to the Crown.
Clause 26 provides:
If at the death of a man who holds a lay 'fee' of the Crown, a sheriff or
royal official produces royal letters patent of summons for a debt due to the
Crown, it shall be lawful for them to seize and list movable goods found in
the lay 'fee' of the dead man to the value of the debt, as assessed by worthy
men. Nothing shall be removed until the whole debt is paid, when the
residue shall be given over to the executors to carry out the dead man's will.
If no debt is due to the Crown, all the movable goods shall be regarded as
the property of the dead man, except the reasonable shares of his wife and
children.3 3 0
The interests of widows and surviving children (as well as other heirs or
creditors) were protected by the first two sentences of Clause 26, which
greatly improved the handling of estates. 3 3 ' As explained by McKechnie,
"[t]he sheriff and bailiffs of the district, where [the] deceased's estates lay,
were in the habit of seizing everything" to secure the interests of the
King.3 2 They "sold chattels out of all proportion to the sum actually
due" and often refused to disgorge the surplus.3 3 3  Clause 26 laid out
procedures to minimize these abusive practices. Royal letters patent had
to vouch for "the existence and the amount of the Crown debt"; 3  the
value of the goods seized had to approximate the value of the debt;33 s and
the process had to be superintended by worthy men "whose function it
was to form a check on the actions of the sheriffs officers."3 3 6  Thus,
Clause 26 protected vulnerable widows and surviving children from
common abuses and was structured in a manner consistent with the
demands of due process3 3 7 and legal transparency.3 3 8
These various provisions, qualified though they were, may have seemed
"extravagantly enlightened" at the time the Magna Carta was sealed-at
330. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 26.
331. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 322 (explaining how Clause 26 was meant to define a




335. Id. at 322-23.
336. Id. at 323.
337. See discussion supra Section I.B.
338. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
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least in comparison to other parts of the world."' "[A]ttention to the
rights of women in any context was unusual for the period." 4 ' To the
extent these provisions demonstrated concern for some of the most
vulnerable members of society, they manifested a respect for human
dignity consistent with the modern understanding of the Rule of Law.
2. Heirs
In the barons' eyes, the greatest of King John's abuses were "his
arbitrary increase of feudal obligations."3 4 ' To address these concerns,
Clauses 2 and 3 of the 1215 Magna Carta limited the inheritance taxes that
could be charged to the male heir of an earl, baron, or other person
holding lands directly of the Crown in exchange for military service.
Clause 2 capped the amount that would be charged to an heir who had
reached majority:
If any earl, baron, or other person that holds lands directly of the
Crown, for military service, shall die, and at his death his heir shall be of full
age and owe a 'relief,' 3 4 2 the heir shall have his inheritance on payment of
the ancient scale of 'relief.' That is to say, the heir or heirs of an earl shall
pay C100 for the entire earl's barony, the heir or heirs of a knight 100s. at
most for the entire knight's 'fee,' and any man that owes less shall pay less, in
accordance with the ancient usage of 'fees.' 34 3
Clause 3 then exempted minor male heirs from any such obligation:
But if the heir of such a person is under age and a ward, when he
comes of age he shall have his inheritance without 'relief' or fine.3 4 4
This provision was intended to prevent a sort of "double dipping" by
forbidding the Crown from exacting relief or a fine in cases where it had
already benefitted from wardship.3 45 As discussed below, wardship was
an often detested feudal incident,34 6 and the benefits and abuses could be
considerable. 3 4  "'[W]ardship' placed [both] the property and person of
339. HINDLEY, supra note 17, at 172.
340. Id. at 166.
341. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 196.
342. A "relief' was "[a] payment made by an heir of a feudal tenant to the feudal lord for the
privilege of succeeding to the ancestor's tenancy." Refief BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
343. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 2 (internal footnote added).
344. Id at cl. 3.
345. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 203 ("The Crown is here forbidden to exact relief
where it had already enjoyed wardship.").
346. See id. at 206 (describing "wardship" as "a much-hated feudal incident").
347. See discussion infra Section V.B.3.
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the heir at the mercy of the Crown,"3 48 for the King could confer the
office of guardian on "whomsoever he would," 3 ' although, as noted
above,3 50 Clause 6 protected heirs from marriage to a person of lower
social standing.3 5 1
3. Duties of Guardians
Guardians of the property of minors "had always strong inducements to
exhaust the soil, stock, and timber, uprooting and cutting down whatever
would fetch a price, and replacing nothing." 35 2  To protect minor heirs
from these abuses, Clause 4 of the 1215 Magna Carta went into
considerable detail:
The guardian of the land of an heir who is under age shall take from it
only reasonable revenues, customary dues, and feudal services. He shall do
this without destruction or damage to men or property. If we have given the
guardianship of the land to a sheriff, or to any person answerable to us for
the revenues, and he commits destruction or damage, we will exact
compensation from him, and the land shall be entrusted to two worthy and
prudent men of the same 'fee,' who shall be answerable to us for the
revenues, or to the person to whom we have assigned them. If we have
given or sold to anyone the guardianship of such land, and he causes
destruction or damage, he shall lose the guardianship of it, and it shall be
handed over to two worthy and prudent men of the same 'fee,' who shall be
similarly answerable to us.3s3
Interestingly, McKechnie describes this provision as "too timid and
half-hearted."3 5 4 Whether he is correct depends on how the provision is
interpreted. If Clause 4 means the unfaithful guardian must only refund
what he has stolen and lose his office if he is caught, but suffer no other
penalty, then perhaps McKechnie is right. As evidence of the possibility
of drafting a more demanding standard, he cites a statute enacted long
after 1215. It provided that "escheators, guilty of waste, should 'yield to
the heir treble damages.'"3 5  However, McKechnie concedes that "[e]ven
the milder provision of [the] Magna Carta was an innovation," though
348. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 206.
349. Id. at 207.
350. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 6 (addressing the familial concerns about
marriage for heirs of noble descent).
351. See id. ("Heirs may be given in marriage but not to someone of lower social standing.").
352. McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 207.
353. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 4.
354. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 207-08.
355. Id. at 209.
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"there is no evidence that it was ever put in[to] force." 3 5 6
Clause 5 of the 1215 Magna Carta specified, in positive rather than
negative terms, the obligations owed by guardians. Clause 5 provides:
For so long as a guardian has guardianship of such land, he shall
maintain the houses, parks, fish preserves, ponds, mills, and everything else
pertaining to it, from the revenues of the land itself. When the heir comes
of age, he shall restore the whole land to him, stocked with plough teams
and such implements of husbandry as the season demands and the revenues
from the land can reasonably bear.3 57
These two provisions dealing with guardians-Clauses 4 and 5-reflect
a concern for the rights and welfare of minors that is consistent with the
modern understanding of the Rule of Law.
4. Debtors
One further provision in the 1215 Charter displayed an important
measure of respect for human dignity as it relates to the treatment of
debtors. Clause 9 provides:
Neither we nor our officials will seize any land or rent in payment of a
debt, so long as the debtor has movable goods sufficient to discharge the
debt. A debtor's sureties shall not be distrained upon so long as the debtor
himself can discharge his debt. If, for lack of means, the debtor is unable to
discharge his debt, his sureties shall be answerable for it. If they so desire,
they may have the debtor's lands and rents until they have received
satisfaction for the debt that they paid for him, unless the debtor can show
that he has settled his obligations to them.3 5 8
The first sentence of this clause had the effect of requiring "[t]he
personal estate of a debtor" to be exhausted by creditors before the debtor
could be stripped of real estate or related revenues.3 5 9  In an agrarian
society, seizing a debtor's land was likely to take away the debtor's
livelihood.36 o To that extent, this provision is infused by the same spirit
as the clause on proportional punishment, discussed above, which dictates
that punishment should not be so hard as to deprive one of making a
living.3 6 ' However, Clause 9 does not explain why sureties stand in a
more favorable position than creditors and, under the language of the last
356. Id.
357. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 5.
358. Id. at cl. 9.
359. See McKECHNIE, .rupra note 16, at 222 (explaining the rules laid down for debt collection).
360. See id. ("[qhattels [alone] could not yield a permanent revenue.").
361. See discussion supra Section V.A.
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sentence, "may have the debtor's lands and rents" as well as moveable
goods.362
VI. EQUAL TREATMENT
The subject on which the Magna Carta is most at odds with modern
sensibilities is precisely where one would expect the feudal world to differ
from the modern: the issue of equal rights. Thus, while the modern Rule
of Law demands equal justice under law, 16  the Magna Carta of 1215
often comes up short.
A. Free Men
The final sentence of Clause 1 seems to make clear that the Magna
Carta is a Charter of liberties only for free men. Clause 1 provides:
FIRST, THAT WE HAVE GRANTED TO GOD, and by this present
[C]harter have confirmed for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English
Church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties
unimpaired. That we wish this so to be observed, appears from the fact that
of our own free will, before the outbreak of the present dispute between us
and our barons, we granted and confirmed by charter the freedom of the
Church's elections-a right reckoned to be of the greatest necessity and
importance to it-and caused this to be confirmed by Pope Innocent III.
This freedom we shall observe ourselves, and desire to be observed in good
faith by our heirs in perpetuity.
TO ALL FREE MEN OF OUR KINGDOM we have also granted,
for us and our heirs for ever, all the liberties written out below, to have and
to keep for them and their heirs, of us and our heirs: 3 64
In addition, the most important provision in the Magna Carta-Clause
39,65 which guaranteed protection from criminal sanctions, except as
imposed by a judgment of equals or the law of the land-expressly limited
its protection to free men. 3 6  This was the norm for the era. In
protecting all "free-holders ... [from being] tried by their inferiors ....
362. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 9 (outlining the action taken if a principal debtor
defaults).
363. See Smith v. United States, 423 U.S. 1303, 1307-08 (1975) ("[A]ll constitutional guarantees
extend both to rich and poor alike, to those with notorious reputations, as well as to those who are
models of upright citizenship. No regime under the [R]ule of [Liaw could comport with
constitutional standards that drew such distinctions.").
364. 1215 Magna Carts, supra note 8, at cl. 1.
365. See discussion supra Section II.A.
366. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 39 ("No free man shall be seized or
imprisoned....").
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English custom did not differ from the procedure prescribed by feudal
usage on the continent of Europe." 6 '
However, there was at least a hope that non-free men might receive
treatment that was in some measure consistent with the guarantees set
forth in the charter. Thus, Clause 60 states:
All these customs and liberties that we have granted shall be observed
in our kingdom in so far as concerns our own relations with our subjects.
Let all men of our kingdom, whether clergy or laymen, observe them
similarly in their relations with their own men.3 6 8
More importantly, the elegant clause on access to justice did not purport
to exclude anyone. It said simply, "To no one will we sell, to no one deny or
delay right or justice."369
Finally, the ultimate clause of the 1215 Magna Carta spoke expansively
of the rights of "men," rather than "free men." Clause 63 states:
IT IS ACCORDINGLY OUR WISH AND COMMAND that the
English Church shall be free, and that men in our kingdom shall have and
keep all these liberties, rights, and concessions, well and peaceably in their
fullness and entirety for them and their heirs, of us and our heirs, in all
things and all places for ever.
Both we and the barons have sworn that all this shall be observed in
good faith and without deceit. Witness the above[-]mentioned people and
many others.
Given by our hand in the meadow that is called Runnymede, between
Windsor and Staines, on the fifteenth day of June in the seventeenth year of
our reign ... .370
B. Jews in England
Present in England since before the Norman Conquest, 71 and
banished from England in 1290,372 Jews occupied an untenable position
in the feudal world and were at various times tolerated, protected, and
persecuted. Operating under many disadvantages and risks, including
367. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 377-78.
368. 1215 Magna Carta, spra note 8, at cl. 60.
369. Id. at cl. 40 (emphasis added).
370. Id. at cl. 63.
371. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 225 (discussing the history of the Jewish people in
England).
372. Id.
373. See id. (identifying three periods of policy).
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attacks in public," Jews in England lent money at rates ranging between
"43 1/3% to 86 2/3% per annum." 3 " However, they did business only
at the mercy of the King, who raked off much of the profits in the form of
"tallages," arbitrary taxes, which sometimes required the payment of
"enormous" sums. 3 Thus, according to McKechnie, "[i]f John saved ...
[the Jews] from being robbed by his Christian subjects, it was [so] that they
might be better worth the robbing by a Christian [K]ing." 3 7 8
The baronial insurgents felt no sympathy for the Jews, and some of
them stopped in London to rob and murder Jews en route to Runnymede
on May 17, 1215.17' The barons, many of whom were in debt,38s
discovered a way to strike at both the Jewish moneylenders and at John.
That cause was the plight of heirs whose fortunes were likely to be
depleted or entirely wasted by the high interest rates on loans made to the
deceased. "During his nonage a ward had nothing wherewith to discharge
either principal or interest, since he who had the wardship drew the
revenue." 381 Then, "[a]t the end of a long minority, an heir would have
found the richest estates swallowed up by a debt which had increased
automatically ten or twenty-fold."3 12 Thus, Clause 10 in the 1215 Charter
provides:
If anyone who has borrowed a sum of money from Jews dies before
the debt has been repaid, his heir shall pay no interest on the debt for so
long as he remains under age, irrespective of whom he holds his lands. If
such a debt falls into the hands of the Crown, it will take nothing except the
principal sum specified in the bond.
Clause 10 would deprive Jews of interest on the money they lent. A
second clause-framed in terms of the interests of widows and surviving
children-then struck at the assets often used as security for loans. Clause
11 provides:
374. See id. (describing a "general massacre" in 1189); see also JOHNSON, supra note 249, at 107
("There were pogroms in London, Norwich, Lincoln and Stamford; and in York 150 Jews ... were
massacred.').
375. MCKECHNIE, stpra note 16, at 224.
376. See Tallage, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("A levy demanded by a feudal
lord from tenants in lieu of the tenants' provision of goods and services.").
377. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 228 (describing the heavy tallage Jewish people were
compelled to pay the Crown).
378. Id. at 229.
379. See id. at 228 ("[U]sing the stones of their houses to fortify the city walls.").
380. JOHNSON, supra note 245, at 106-07.
381. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 224.
382. Id.
383. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 10.
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If a man dies owing money to Jews, his wife may have her dower and
pay nothing towards the debt from it. If he leaves children that are under
age, their needs may also be provided for on a scale appropriate to the size
of his holding of lands. The debt is to be paid out of the residue, reserving
the service due to his feudal lords. Debts owed to persons other than Jews
are to be dealt with similarly.3 8 4
Under Clause 11, a widow's dower lands were beyond the reach of her
deceased husband's creditors. In many cases, the effect of this provision
was to reduce the security for a loan by one-third.3 " What remained was
further reduced by amounts needed to provide necessities for minor
children or repay feudal lords (such as the barons who forced John to sign
the Magna Carta). Presumably, it was not much consolation to Jewish
moneylenders that the final clause provided repayment of debts to other
persons would be treated similarly.
Clauses 10 and 11 were dropped from the 1216 Magna Carta and never
reappeared in later versions.3 8 6 However, the substance of those
provisions was reenacted in other laws. Historian Paul Johnson concludes
the "Magna Carta undermined the economic basis of English medieval
Jewry." 3 8 7
C. Testimony by Women
The 1215 Magna Carta confirmed the existing rule,3 " which held the
testimony of women was in many instances legally insignificant. Clause 54
states:
No one shall be arrested or imprisoned on the appeal of a woman for
the death of any person except her husband.3 8
This clause, which dealt only with cases involving murder, declared
"that no woman has the right to institute proceedings in this way for the
death of [her] father, son, or friend, but only for that of her husband."3 9 0
The Charter recognized no such disability in the case of men.
Clause 54 had the effect of often depriving women of their day in court.
There are entries on the plea rolls showing that women presented claims
384. Id. at cl. 11.
385. See McKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 231 ("[O]nly two-thirds ... remaining
386. See id. (citing the omission of provisions in the Magna Carta).
387. JOHNSON, supra note 245, at 107.
388. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 453 ("[Tlhe barons here made no change on existing
law.").
389. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 54.
390. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 453.
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"for the death of a son, a brother, a nephew or a mother."3 9 1 However,
according to Faith Thompson, "whenever the Great Charter was
invoked ... [the women were] non-suited." 3 9 2
D. Earls and Barons
Earls and barons were extensively insulated from criminal liability 9 3 by
Clause 21, which effectively created a class privilege for the aristocracy.
Clause 21 states:
Earls and barons shall be fined only by their equals, and in proportion
to the gravity of their offence.3 9 4
In the early thirteenth century, the number of earls and barons was
small.3 9 s It is easy to envision how this type of provision might have been
conducive to a "conspiracy of silence" whereby there was a tacit
agreement among the barons not to condemn one another. However, the
alternative is also possible, namely that earls and barons might hold their
own to a higher standard. In one instance, a "Thomas de Furnivall was
confident a local jury would 'tax' him at a lower figure than that fixed by
the Exchequer barons."3 9 6
E. Immigrants
One serious concern for the barons was the fact that French supporters
of King John during his military quests in France had been promoted to
positions of power and authority in England, thus diminishing the barons'
influence. To remedy this problem, King John was forced to promise they
would be dismissed. Thus, in a sharp turn from the Magna Carta's
magisterial principles of due process and good governance, Clause 50
launches an ad hominem attack against persons whose names are now oddly
memorialized in the Great Charter. That provision bluntly states:
We will remove completely from their offices the kinsmen of Gerard de
Ath6e, and in future they shall hold no offices in England. The people in
391. FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION 1300-1629, at 55 (1948) (citation omitted).
392. Id.
393. "The House of Lords (except in cases involving the dignity or status of a peer) has never
claimed to act as a court of first instance in civil cases to which a peer was a parry." MCKECHNIE,
supra note 16, at 392.
394. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 21.
395. Cf TURNER, supra note 48, at 18 ("[A]bout 165 men ranked as barons at the end of the
twelfth century ... [and earls numbered] fourteen or fifteen on John's accession in 1199.").
396. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 297.
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question are Engelard de Cigogn6, Peter, Guy, and Andrew de Chanceaux,
Guy de Cigogn6, Geoffrey de Martigny and his brothers, Philip Marc and his
brothers, with Geoffrey his nephew, and all their followers.3 9 7
There is no indication these persons were to be accorded due process or
judged on the merits-which is what the Rule of Law requires.3 98 Far
from being accorded equal treatment by the law, the designated individuals
were summarily singled out for an unavoidable penalty based on
nationality.3 9 9  The only consolation is that many of them are now
remembered in the text of one of history's most famous documents.
F. On Balance
As the foregoing sections make clear, the 1215 Magna Carta was in no
sense a model of equal treatment under the law. However, this is not
surprising. "'Equality' is essentially a modern ideal ... ."00 The concept
that all persons are created equal and should enjoy equal rights did not take
root politically until centuries later,4 0 ' and even then legal practices often
fell (and still fall) short of the underlying ideals.
However, it is important to remember the Magna Carta did in fact
protect a much wider array of persons and entities than just free men and
aristocrats. It recognized the freedom of the church; 4 02 the rights of "all
merchants"40s and "any man"404 to travel; the liberties, customs, and
397. 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 50.
398. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 632 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting justice
Douglas's concurring opinion for the principle that in a society that prizes the Rule of Law, "the
guilty as well as the innocent are entitled to a fair trial" (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring))).
399. Cf United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 285 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that "respecting the rights of foreign nationals" is required by the Rule of Law).
400. MCKECHNIE, supra note 16, at 114.
401. Lincoln's objective in the Civil War was to save a form of government "whose leading
object is, to elevate the condition of men-to lift artificial weights from all shoulders-to clear the
paths of laudable pursuit for all-to afford all, an unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the race of
life." Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 438 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953).
402. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 1 ("[T]he English church shall be free, and shall
have its rights undiminished and its liberties unimpaired . . .
403. Id. at cl. 41. Clause 41 provides:
All merchants may enter or leave England unharmed and without fear, and may stay or travel
within it, by land or water, for purposes of trade, free from all illegal exactions, in accordance
with ancient and lawful customs. This, however, does not apply in time of war to merchants
from a country that is at war with us. Any such merchants found in our country at the outbreak
of war shall be detained without injury to their persons or property, until we or our chief justice
have discovered how our own merchants are being treated in the country at war with us. If our
own merchants are safe they shall be safe too.
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obligations of cities4 0 5 or similar entities;4 0 6 and the interests and needs of
hostages4 0 7 and mercenaries,4os as well as the rights of widows, surviving
children, heirs, and wards,409 not to mention persons accused of crime.4 o
Rather than condemn the 1215 Charter for failing to meet twenty-first
century standards regarding equal treatment, it is better to recognize the
Magna Carta was an important landmark in legal development. It
eventually moved legal institutions across the globe closer to the ideal of
equal justice under law and practices that are consistent with the Rule of
Law.
VII. OTHER PROVISIONS
Not every laudable modern legal concept can be traced to the Magna
Carta. So too, not every provision in the Magna Carta relates to the
modern Rule .of Law. There are many provisions in the 1215 Magna Carta
that deal with other miscellaneous issues, which were generally matters of
only temporary importance. Such clauses dealt with feudal obligations4 "
Id.
404. Id. at cl. 42. Clause 42 provides:
In [the] future it shall be lawful for any man to leave and return to our kingdom unharmed
and without fear, by land or water, preserving his allegiance to us, except in time of war, for
some short period, for the common benefit of the realm. People that have been imprisoned or
outlawed in accordance with the law of the land, people from a country that is at war with us,
and merchants-who shall be dealt with as stated above [see supra note 403, discussing 1215
Magna Carta cl. 41]-are excepted from this provision.
Id.
405. See id. at cl. 13 ("The city of London shall enjoy all its ancient liberties and free customs,
both by land and by water. We also will and grant that all other cities, boroughs, towns, and ports
shall enjoy all their liberties and free customs.'; id. at cl. 23 ("No town or person shall be forced to
build bridges over rivers except those with an ancient obligation to do so.").
406. See id. at cl. 25 ("Every county, hundred, wapentake, and tithing shall remain at its ancient
rent, without increase, except the royal demesne manors."). A "hundred" was "a county subdivision
that had its own local court." Hundred, BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY (10th ed. 2014). "In some
English counties," a "wapentake" was "a division corresponding to the hundred or ward in other
counties." Wapentake, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). "Ridings" were "[o]ne of the
three administrative districts into which Yorkshire was formerly divided. . .. " Riding, THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICnONARY (2d ed. 1989).
407. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
408. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 51 ("As soon as peace is restored, we will
remove from the kingdom all the foreign knights, bowmen, their attendants, and the mercenaries that
have come to it, to its harm, with horses and arms.").
409. See discussion supra Section V.B.
410. See discussion supra Part II.
411. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 16 ("No man shall be forced to perform more
service for a knight's 'fee,' or other free holding of land, than is due from it."); id. at cl. 29 ("No
constable may compel a knight to pay money for castle-guard if the knight is willing to undertake the
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and taxes;4 12  intestate distribution;"' forestS 4 14  and rivers; 4 15
standardized units of measure;416 founders of abbeys; 4 '7 and pardons.4 18
VIII. CONCLUSION
Today, authors are quick to point out that only four of the original
sixty-three provisions in the 1215 Magna Carta are still good law in
England.4 1 ' Two of those provisions guarantee the freedom of the
English Church4 2 0 and the rights of the city of London.' The other
guard in person, or with reasonable excuse to supply some other fit man to do it. A knight taken or
sent on military service shall be excused from castle-guard for the period of this service.'); id. at cl. 43
("If a man holds lands of any 'escheat' such as the 'honour' of Wallingford, Nottingham, Boulogne,
Lancaster, or of other 'escheats' in our hand that are baronies, at his death his heir shall give us only
the 'relief' and service that he would have made to the baron, had the barony been in the baron's
hand. We will hold the 'escheat' in the same manner as the baron held it.').
412. See id. at cl. 15 ("In future we will allow no one to levy an 'aid' from his free men, except
to ransom his person, to make his eldest son a knight, and (once) to marry his eldest daughter. For
these purposes only a reasonable 'aid' may be levied.").
413. See id. at cl. 27 ("If a free man dies intestate, his movable goods are to be distributed by his
next-of-kin and friends, under the supervision of the Church. The rights of his debtors are to be
preserved.").
414. See id. at cl. 44 ("People who live outside the forest need not in future appear before the
royal justices of the forest in answer to general summonses, unless they are actually involved in
proceedings or are sureties for someone who has been seized for a forest offence."); id. at cl. 47 ("All
forests that have been created in our reign shall at once be disafforested.").
415. See id. at cl. 33 ("All fish-weirs shall be removed from the Thames, the Medway, and
throughout the whole of England, except on the sea coast.").
416. See id. at cl. 35 ("There shall be standard measures of wine, ale, and corn (the London
quarter), throughout the kingdom. There shall also be a standard width of dyed cloth, russet, and
haberject, namely two ells within the selvedges. Weights are to be standardised similarly.").
417. See id. at cl. 46 ("All barons who have founded abbeys, and have charters of English kings
or ancient tenure as evidence of this, may have guardianship of them when there is no abbot, as is
their due.").
418. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. 62. Clause 62 states:
We have remitted and pardoned fully to all men any ill-will, hurt, or grudges that have arisen
between us and our subjects, whether clergy or laymen, since the beginning of the dispute. We
have in addition remitted fully, and for our own part have also pardoned, to all clergy and
laymen any offences committed as a result of the said dispute between Easter in the sixteenth
year of our reign (i.e., 1215) and the restoration of peace.
In addition we have caused letters patent to be made for the barons, bearing witness to this
security and to the concessions set out above, over the seals of Stephen [A]rchbishop of
Canterbury, Henry [A]rchbishop of Dublin, the other bishops named above, and Master
Pandulf.
Id
419. See, e.g., VINCENT, supra note 23, at 4 (stating "all but four" of the "clauses ha[vel been
declared obsolete").
420. See 1215 Magna Carta, supra note 8, at cl. I ([TIhe English church shall be free, and shall
have its rights undiminished and its liberties unimpaired. ... ")
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two provisions deal with the legal system, guaranteeing justice will not be
sold or denied4 22 and that persons will be punished only in accordance
with the lawful judgment of their equals or "the law of the land."42
It is not surprising the other fifty-nine clauses have been repealed. They
dealt in specific terms with the problems of a different age. No one would
have expected them to last 800 years.
The Magna Carta's diminished scope as a repository of currently
applicable legal rules does not detract from its status as a landmark in the
development of the law. In its time, it was "a revelation of the possibility
of freedom to the [medieval] world."' 24 There had never been anything
remotely similar, and "[a]fter this long list of liberties had been conferred
upon Englishmen, nothing could ever be quite the same." 42 ' As Ralph V.
Turner observed, "[t]he Great Charter's capacity for growth, as long after
1215 as the seventeenth century [in England] and as far away as [the]
eighteenth[] century [in] North America, makes it a unique political
document, a standard for judging a state's treatment of its citizens
today."4 2 6
Rich in detail42' and concerned about issues that will always be at the
center of the search for justice, the Magna Carta was unprecedented. Over
the course of eight centuries, it has inspired reformers and catalyzed the
development of a robust modern formulation of the Rule of Law.4 2 8
"The Great Charter set the expectations that for 800 years have shaped
the development of the law in England, America, and around the
globe."4 29 Like a blazing light in the medieval darkness, "the Magna Carta
illuminated the importance of legal principles, fair procedures,
421. See id. at cl. 13 ("The city of London shall enjoy all its ancient liberties and free customs,
both by land and by water.").
422. See id. at cl. 40 ("To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.").
423. Id. at cl. 39.
424. STENTON, supra note 57, at 3 (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM STUBBS, EPOCHS
OF MODERN HISTORY: THE EARLY PLANTAGENETS 158 (Edward E. Morris et al. eds., N.Y.C.,
Charles Scribner's Sons, 8th ed. 1896)).
425. Id.
426. TURNER, supra note 48, at 8.
427. See VINCENT, supra note 23, at 22 ("What was unusual about Magna Carta was ... the
detail .. . .
428. See JOHN E. BEBOUT, AN ANCIENT PARTNERSHIP: LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MAGNA
CARTA, AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 20-21 (1966) ("The special meaning of the [Riule of [L]aw
in English and American government .. . is a result of the way in which the common law evolved in
the decisions of the courts during the Middle Ages.").
429. Vincent R. Johnson, The Magna Carta and the Expectations It SetforAnglo-Amerncan Law, SAN
ANTONIO LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2015, at 5, 5; see also Vincent R. Johnson, The Great Charter, 78 TEX. B.J.
266, 266-69 (2015) (discussing the influence of the Magna Carta on the law of Texas).
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proportional punishment, official accountability, and respect for human
dignity." 430 It undoubtedly ranks among the most important legal
documents ever written.
430. Id.
431. Some of the language and ideas contained in this work first appeared in a much shorter
magazine article written by the author. SeeJohnson, spra note 429, at 5.
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APPENDIX A




WHEREAS, The year 2015 marks the 800th anniversary of the
signing of the Magna Carta, one of the foundational documents of our
system of government, law, and jurisprudence; and
WHEREAS, In the early years of the 13th century, the barons of
England rose up in rebellion against their monarch, King John; they
objected to his excessive taxation, punitive fines, and manipulation of the
legal system, and they forced the king to negotiate with them at
Runnymede, along the River Thames in Southern England; and
WHEREAS, On June 15, 1215, King John and the barons agreed
upon the Magna Carta, or "Great Charter"; drafted in Latin, this
remarkable document addressed the grievances of the barons and put
limits on the executive power of the king, initiating a tradition of individual
liberty and rule of law that has since echoed around the globe; and
WHEREAS, The Magna Carta strongly influenced the
constitutions of both the United States and Texas; it was relied upon by
the drafters of the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas, and it is
one of the sources for the Texas Bill of Rights; in the early 201 century,
the Texas Supreme Court declared that "all grants of power are to be
interpreted in the light of the maxims of Magna Carta; and
WHEREAS, Among the document's most famous and influential
provisions is Clause 39, which declares that no one shall be imprisoned or
stripped of his rights, "except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by
the law of the land"; from this clause derives an individual's right to due
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process of law and trial by jury, as well as the concept of habeas corpus,
which protects citizens against illegal imprisonment; and
WHEREAS, Also influential is Clause 40, which states that "To
no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice"; this elegant
formulation is the basis of the "open courts" provision in the Texas
Constitution, which guarantees that all litigants have the opportunity to
redress their grievances and receive their day in court; and
WHEREAS, On a summer's day eight centuries ago, in a field by
the bank of the Thames, the English people lit a flame of liberty that
continues to burn brightly in the Lone Star State, ensuring that all Texans
are guaranteed their fundamental rights to justice and fair treatment under
the law; now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED, That the House of Representatives of the 84th
Texas Legislature hereby commemorate the 800t anniversary of the
Magna Carta.
Joe Straus
Speaker of the House
I certify that H.R. No. 2402 was adopted by the House on May 7,
2015, by a non-record vote.
Robert Haney
Chief Clerk of the House
Four Price
State Representative
District 87
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